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INTRODUCTION
This Article draws on a case study of merchant law in a
merchant court to reexamine, and, ultimately, to challenge, the
fundamental premise of the Uniform Commercial Code's adjudica-
tive philosophy, the idea that courts should seek to discover
"immanent business norms" and use them to decide cases.' This
philosophy finds expression in specific Code sections2 and Official
Comments,' judicial opinions,4 academic commentary,5 and the
' Although for simplicity of exposition this Article refers to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code ("the Code"), its focus is exclusively on Article 2 as supplemented by the
pertinent general and definitional sections of Article 1.
2 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1991) ("Underlying purposes and policies of this
Act are ... to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties .... ."); id. § 1-103 ("Unless displaced by
the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the
law merchant.., shall supplement its provisions."); id. § 2-314(2)(a) ("Goods to be
merchantable must.., pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion.... ."); id. § 2-314(3) ("[I]mplied warranties may arise from course of dealing or
usage of trade."); id. § 2-504(b) (requiring a seller to provide those shipping
documents required by usage of trade); id. § 2-609(2) ("Between merchants the
reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered
shall be determined according to commercial standards.").
'See e.g., id. § 1-102 cmt. 1 ("This Act is drawn... [to] provide its own machinery
for expansion of commercial practices."); id. § 1-205 cmt. 1 ("[T]he meaning of the
agreement of the parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by
their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other
surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for interpretation are set
by the commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the language of
a formal or final writing."); id. § 2-202 cmt. 1(b) (explaining that language is to be
given the "meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used");
id. § 2-202 cmt. 2 ("[W]ritings are to be read on the assumption that the course of
prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted
when the document was phrased."); id. § 2-603 cmt. 1 (recognizing 'the duty imposed
upon the merchant buyer by good faith and commercial practice to follow any
reasonable instructions of the seller as to reshipping, storing, delivery to a third party,
reselling, or the like").
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Documents that are arguably part of the Code's legislative history also discuss
this idea. See e.g., Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAw. 113,
126 (1951) ("[T]hepractces of businessmen and business houses are important factors
in construing their contracts and actions and in determining their rights and liabilities
.... [M]any of the changes effected by the Code are designed to adapt rules of law
to the way that business is actually carried on." (quoting the Report of the Committee
on the Proposed Commercial Code)).
' See infra cases cited notes 66, 68, 74.
5See, e.g., ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. ScoTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSAcTIONS:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 8-9 (2d ed. 1991) ("Article II of the Code can profitably be
viewed as adapting the philosophy of 'immanent law' to a specific context.... [It]
frequently speaks as though courts should discover the law merchant from a careful,
disinterested examination of custom and fact situations."); Richard Danzig, A Comment
on the Jursprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 624, 635
(1975) (suggesting that to Llewellyn, "an 'immanent law' lay embedded in any
situation and the task of the law authority was to discover it .... [T]he animating
theory of Article II is that the law is immanent. The law job is to search it out ....
[It] is a document whose thrust is... to coerce courts into looking for law in life.");
James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk. A Note on Llewellyn's
Germanic Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 159-66 (1987)
(discussing the Germanic origin of Llewellyn's dedication to the search for"immanent
business norms"). In addition, many scholars have suggested that the Code does not
give enough weight to "immanent business norms." See e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The
Significance of Contract Theoy, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1304 (1990) ("Relational
contract theory suggests that solving the problem [of contract interpretation] begins
with the definition of norms which are immanent in the context."); Ian R. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classica Neoclassica and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 898 (1978) (suggesting that the
neoclassical approach to contract law be replaced by relational contract law in which
"recognition is easily accorded to the creation ofsuch [contractual] interests arising
naturally from any behavior patterns within the relation"); Richard E. Speidel, Article
2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 789, 804-05 (1993) (suggesting
that the Code's definition ofagreement "should be revised to clearly incorporate into
the contract internal norms generated by the relationship"); RussellJ. Weintraub, A
Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1, 21 ("An important lesson
that can be learned from relational contracts is the methods of accommodation
parties of approximately equal bargaining power use when disputes arise. These
methods should be reflected in legal rules to reinforce decent practice."). One
scholar has argued that relational norms should be given additional weight in the
franchise context. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the
Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. RIv. 927, 991-92 (1990) ("The necessary
incompleteness of the franchise contract prompts an examination of the norms and
practices-the relational structure of franchising-to identify the complete content of
the franchisor and franchisee's exchange."). Other scholars have suggested that these
norms should be used to develop commercial law in formerly socialist countries, or
to improve commercial law in common law countries. See Robert D. Cooter,
Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 226 (1994) ("The role of the state in a decentralized legal
system is to elevate appropriate social norms to the level of law[,] ... lawmakers
should identify the actual norms that have arisen in business communities[,] ...
identify the incentive structures that produced the norms[,] ... [and enforce t]hose
business norms that arise from an efficient incentive structure."); Paul H. Rubin,
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writings of the Code's principal drafter, Karl Llewellyn.6  Most
importantly, it is the basis of the Code's definition of agreement,
which includes "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance."
7
The Article 2 Editorial Board recently reaffirmed that "reducing the
gap between law and practice.., in the relevant business commu-
nity"8 remains a primary objective of the Code. It is currently
considering amendments that would broaden the reach of the
Code's course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade
provisions.9
This Article challenges the idea that courts should seek to
discover and apply immanent business norms in deciding cases."
Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1994)
(suggesting that trade associations should be formed to interpret and enforce
contracts according to commercial custom so that, over time, customs will become
sufficiently well developed to supply the basic principles of a public commercial law);
see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1646 (1996)
(suggesting that as an economy increases in complexity, it becomes increasingly
important for courts to enforce certain types of business custom).
6 See e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REV.
873, 903-04 (1939) (containing a "plea for merchants' law to be recognized and be
further made for merchants"); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society:
1I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 389 n.124 (1937) (criticizing the Uniform Sales Act for
"the amazing degree to which it has failed to reflect either commercial understanding
or commercial need"); see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT: THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 253-54
(1941) (noting, in a comment thought to have been drafted by Llewellyn, that while
"the law about the effect of 'business custom' is quite.., uncertain... that has not
been because any sane Court for half-a-century doubted the wisdom of fully
incorporating the relevant usage of trade into the agreement and into the adequacy
of performance").
7 U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
8 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 (1990).
' The preliminary report of the Article 2 Study Group emphasized that the Code's
provision on course of dealing and usage of trade, UCC § 1-205, "is a crucial
component of the [Code's] broad definition of agreement." Id. at 32. It also
recommended moving UCC § 2-208, course of performance or practical construction,
to Article 1, because "[t]his important principle of interpretation should not be
limited to contracts for the sale of goods." Id.
" The desirability of commercial law attempting to mirror actual business
practices has, with some notable exceptions, gone largely unchallenged. See David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1850-63 & n.149 (1991) [hereinafter Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains] (suggesting that courts should "try to distinguish between customs that are
efficient to use as nonlegal customs, i.e., standard social practices, as contrasted to
MERCHANT LAW IN A MERCHANT COURT
It demonstrates that while the drafters of the Code sought to
incorporate these norms into the law in an effort to make commer-
cial law more responsive to and reflective of commercial reality,
they failed to recognize that this approach would fundamentally
alter the very reality they sought to reflect, and would do so in ways
that would have undesirable effects on commercial relationships and
would undermine the Code's own stated goals of promoting
flexibility in commercial transactions and "permit[ting] the
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties."
11
In the spirit of the Code and Karl Llewellyn, this Article begins
by looking at merchant practice. It presents a case study of the
private legal system created by the National Grain and Feed
Association ("NGFA") to resolve contract disputes among its
members. The study pays especially close attention to the willing-
ness of NGFA's industry-expert adjudicators to take trade usage,
12
course of dealing, and course of performance into account in
deciding cases. It finds that despite their industry expertise, NGFA
arbitrators are reluctant to look to these indicia of immanent
business norms. Unlike courts, which often permit course of
dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade to trump
express written terms, NGFA arbitrators take a formalistic approach
customs that should be enforced as well as a legal or contractual matter"); David
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REV. 373 (1990)
[hereinafter Charny, NonlegalSanctions] (arguing that nonlegal commitments should
only be enforced in certain narrowly defined situations); Jason S. Johnston, The
Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1859,1862 (1996) (questioning whether it is "really appropriate to apply norms
that evolve in the context of ongoing relationships-relationships governed primarily
by extralegal sanctions-to the resolution of litigated disputes that-the parties, by
definition, did not anticipate," but concluding that in some situations it may be); see
also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 136 (1996) (discussing the
effects of "legal rules designed to regulate intragroup relations," and concluding
that "with the exception of rules that deter extreme bad faith conduct, even rules that
merely duplicate the group's own norms will generally undermine self-regulation").
For a challenge to the idea that courts should enforce customary norms as implied
contractual obligations in the employment setting, see Edward B. Rock & Michael
L. Wachter, Internal LaborMarkets, Norms, and Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1932-38
(1996).
n U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
12 This Article uses the terms "custom" and "trade usage" interchangeably even
though it is far easier to establish a trade usage under the Code than it was to
establish a custom at common law. See id. § 1-205 cmt. 4 (distinguishing the Code's
meaning of usage from the common law meaning of custom).
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to adjudication. They do not permit these considerations to vary
either trade rules or written contractual provisions. This Article
develops a theory to explain why sophisticated merchant-transactors
might find NGFA's approach to adjudication preferable to the
Code's approach, and then draws on it to analyze the effects of the
Code's adjudicative approach on commercial relationships.
Part I describes NGFA's private legal system and compares its
tribunal's adjudicative philosophy to the adjudicative philosophy
underlying the Code. Part II discusses the reasons that sophisti-
cated transactors might allocate some aspects of their contracting
relationship to the legal realm and some to the extralegal realm, or
might include a provision in their written contract while acting or
agreeing to act in another, perhaps contradictory, way. It suggests
that recognizing the reasons that rational transactors may act or
agree to act in ways that may contradict the terms of their contract
undermines an important assumption underlying the Code's
definition of agreement, namely that "the course of actual perfor-
mance by the parties is ... the best indication of what they
intended the[ir] writing to mean.""3 It then reconsiders the
desirability of the Code's definition of agreement under the more
realistic assumption that there is no necessary connection between
transactors' actions and their intended meaning of the written
provisions in their contract. It concludes that because the Code
makes it difficult to enter into purely extralegal self-enforcing
agreements, it prevents transactors from selecting the value-
maximizing combination of legal and extralegal terms.
Part III is the core of the analysis. It begins by suggesting that
transactors do not necessarily want the relationship-preserving
norms14 they follow in performing contracts and cooperatively
resolving disputes among themselves to be used by third-party
neutrals to decide cases when they are in an end-game situation.
1 5
After presenting evidence that merchants implicitly recognize the
distinction between relationship-preserving and end-game norms, it
suggests that when courts apply the Code's usage of trade, course
of dealing, and course of performance provisions, they will often be
using relationship-preserving norms to resolve end-game disputes.
is Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
14 See infra note 101 and accompanying text (defining relationship-preserving
norms).
5 See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of end-
game).
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It then explores the effects of this aspect of the Code's adjudicative
approach on contracting relationships, and demonstrates that this
approach both prevents transactors from selecting their preferred
mix of legal and extralegal terms and makes them less willing to
flexibly adjust their contracting relationships. It also suggests that
this approach may undermine transactors' attempts to create the
contracting framework that will best promote successful renegotia-
tion and long-term cooperation. Part III concludes by exploring the
reasons that the Code's adjudicative approach may inhibit the
"expansion of commercial practices." 6
Part IV returns to the case study and considers the reasons that
NGFA's adjudicative approach is particularly well-suited to the
private adjudication of grain and feed disputes. Finally, the Article
concludes by offering some preliminary thoughts on the implica-
tions of the empirical observations and analysis presented in earlier
sections for reform of the Code.
I. MERCHANT LAW AND COMMERCIAL LAW
The merchant-court system developed by the NGFA provides an
unusual opportunity to empirically explore and reevaluate the
Code's search for immanent business norms in a context where the
concerns of litigation costs and institutional competence that have
been the focus of the limited debate about the Code's adjudicative
approach are conspicuously absent. This Part describes the
operation of the NGFA system and compares the extent to which
NGFA arbitrators applying the Association's trade rules and courts
applying the Code are willing to look to usage of trade, course of
dealing, and course of performance in deciding cases. It demon-
strates that despite the industry-specific expertise and business
acumen of NGFA arbitrators, in practice they give far less weight to
these indicia of immanent business norms than do generalist courts
applying the Code.
A. The NGFA System
The NGFA is a trade association of firms and individuals who
are active in the cash-markets for grain and feed. It began arbitrat-
ing disputes in 1896 and has been publishing written arbitration
opinions since 1902. As a condition of membership in the Associa-
16 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
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don, members must agree to submit all disputes with other
members to the Association's arbitration system." A member who
refuses to submit to arbitration or fails to comply with an arbitra-
tion award rendered against him may, in addition to having his
actions reported in the NGFA newsletter, be suspended or expelled
from the Association.'
8
The NGFA has adopted four sets of substantive trade rules that
are designed to "reflect trade practice and facilitate trade between
NGFA members."' The Grain Rules and the Feed Rules each
cover the basics of contract formation, performance, repudiation,
breach, damages, and excuse. The Barge Rules supplement these
rules whenever "shipments are designated by contract to be
17 See NGFA BYLAWS, art. II, § 2(0. The NGFA Trade Rules and Arbitration Rules
are published in booklet form each year and are reprinted, along with the Bylaws, in
the Annual NGFA Directory/Yearbook. See, e.g., NGFA, NGFA DIRECTORY/
YEARBOOK 1994-95, at 330-50,359-62,368-75 (1995) [hereinafter NGFA DIRECTORY].
The NGFA arbitration opinions can be found in NGFA, PROTECTING YOUR
COMPANY'S INTEREST IN TRADING AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES (1991 & Supp.)
[hereinafter NGFA, PROTECTING].
is See NGFA BYLAWS, art. IX, § 2(a)-(c) (explaining some of the grounds for
expulsion or suspension); id. art. X, § 1 (describing the procedure for expelling a
member). Between 1975 and 1995, three members were expelled for refusing to
arbitrate. See American Commercial Barge Line Co., NGFA Misc. Case No. 2 (1995)
(expelling ACBL and noting that "it is the NGFA's long-standing interpretation of the
NGFA Bylaws, Trade Rules and Arbitration Rules that compulsory arbitration of
disputes is not a matter that can be altered by a member's contractual documents
and is a fundamental obligation of membership"); Houston Pub. Elevator, NGFA
Misc. Case No. 1 (1988) (expelling Houston Public Elevator, explaining that "[w]ith-
out compulsory arbitration, the process would be used only when convenient
in defending a given position" and noting that the "equality that all members,
large and small, now enjoy in seeking fair play would quickly evaporate"); S.M. Whit-
ney Co. v. Mundy, Inc., NGFA Case No. 1626 (1985) (expelling Mundy, Inc.).
During this period, one member was expelled for failure to comply with an
arbitration award.
19 NGFA GRAIN TRADE R. pmbl. When the trade rules were originally adopted,
custom was the starting point for the codifiers. However, changes in unwritten
customary practices have not been the primary motivation for trade rule amend-
ments. Rather, amendments have been primarily: (1) technical wording changes
designed to correct typographical errors or enhance clarity; (2) changes motivated by
arbitration opinions suggesting that a rule was unclear, unworkable, or undesirable;
(3) changes introduced in response to technological innovations; (4) changes
introduced in response to changes in state or federal regulations; and, finally, (5)
changes introduced in response to important changes in the market. In addition, at
least one change was explicitly designed to change an existing custom. See NGFA,
WHO'S WHO IN THE GRAIN TRADE 37 (Nov. 1920) (reporting that the newly adopted
Rule 29 provides that "the specifications of a contract cannot be altered or amended
without express consent of both the buyer and the seller (this abolishes the custom
of silence confirms)").
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transported by barge,"20 and the Barge Freight Trading Rules
"govern all disputes [involving] ... the purchase and/or sale of
barge transportation."21 Unless they have been explicitly altered
or excluded by a specific contractual provision, these rules govern
all contracts between NGFA members. Together, they provide a
comprehensive set of default rules governing the most important
aspects of cash-market transactions in grain or feed.
The trade rules are supplemented by a highly detailed set of
arbitration rules, whose applicability to disputes between NGFA
members cannot be altered by contract. These rules set out the
required filing fee,22 the guidelines for the selection of arbitra-
tors,21 the types of information each party must provide to the
tribunal,24 the procedures for requesting an oral hearing,25 the
type of information the arbitrators should include in their written
opinions,26 and the procedures for filing and conducting an intra-
2 NCFA BARGE TRADE R. pmbl.
21 NGFA BARGE FREIGHT TRADING R. pmbl.
' See NGFA ARB. R. 5(c) (noting that the required fee ranges from $200 to $1500
depending on the amount at stake).
" The primary arbitration committee is composed of three members chosen by
the National Secretary "with a view to forming each committee of prominent people
experienced in the type of trade involved in the cases to be brought before it."
NGFA ARB. R. 4(a). Arbitrators are required to disclose any circumstance that could
affect their impartiality, see NGFA ARB. R. 8(a), and may recuse themselves from
particular cases. Parties may also challenge the selection of an arbitrator "for
prejudicial or other causes." NGFA ARB. R. 8. The National Secretary then
determines whether the arbitrator should be replaced. See id.
24 See NGFA ARB. R. 6(a) ("[P]art[ies] will be expected to furnish... [the arbitra-
tors with the] contract or contracts, if any, including all written evidence, letters, and
telegrams, tending to establish the terms and conditions[,]... [t]he confirmation of
the contract ... ; Shipping directions, if any; Bills of lading, if any; Inspection
certificates from point of shipment, if any; Inspection certificates from point of
destination, if any; Freight expense bills, if there is any dispute regarding freight paid;
Confirmation of freight rates, when that question enters into the case; Authority for
freight rate, when difference of rate is involved; Proof of market difference ...
[which] might be the price bulletin of the market to which the grain in question was
shipped, or intended to be shipped.... but in case it is necessary to establish such
difference in a market where no price bulletin is regularly issued, affidavits by
disinterested parties should be furnished.").
2 An oral hearing must be held if the chairman of the arbitration panel or either
party requests it. See NGFA ARB. R. 8(b)(3), (f). Otherwise, the chairman decides
whether to "call[] a meeting of the members of a Committee," to reach a decision
"[b]y passing the papers from one [committee member] to another by mail," or to use
"such other means as the Chairman may deem necessary." NGFA ARB. R. 8(b). A
party who requests a hearing is required to post a bond for hearing costs, but most
cases are decided without an oral hearing.
" See NGFA ARB. R. 8(m) (providing that opinions must specify: "(1) [t]he names
of the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) [t]he award(s) of the Committee, giving the
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association appeal.2 7  They include a one-year statute of limita-
tions."8 Under the trade rules, the time from filing to judgment is
supposed to be less than six months.
29
The typical cash-market transaction in grain or feed that is
governed by these rules is negotiated on the telephone, sometimes
with the assistance of a broker, and is promptly confirmed through
the exchange of written, largely standard-form, confirmatory
memoranda.30 The most common issues arbitrated are those that
NGFA classifies as dealing with confirmations, custom of the trade,
grades, failure to deliver, and weight."' Arbitrated disputes over
unforeseen contingencies are rare. Claims of commercial impracti-
cability are infrequently raised and almost never successful.
3 2
names of the plaintiff and defendant in each case, the nature of the case and the
amount involved, the award and such other information as may be of interest to the
members; (3) [n]otice of failures to comply with the terms of awards, giving a record
of each case; (4) [n]otice of refusals to arbitrate... ; (5) [n]otice of failures to answer
the correspondence of the National Secretary relative to arbitration").
See NGFA ARB. R. 9 (providing guidelines for selecting the five-member appeals
panel, requiring the losing party to post a bond in the amount of the judgment,
specifying the appeals fee, and giving the parties the right to request an oral hearing).
28 See NGFA Ana. R. 3(d). The Code's statute of limitations is four years. See
U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
2 See NGFA ARn. R. 7(b)-(h), 8(k) (setting out the timing requirements for the
filing of cases and the making of an award). However, many cases take longer,
particularly when there are multiple parties or a natural disaster leads to the
simultaneous filing of numerous cases. See Panel Discussant, Remarks at the National
Grain and Feed Association Centennial Convention (Mar. 1996).
" The trade rules provide that these memoranda should include certain basic
information about the trade. See NGFA GRAIN TRADE R. 1 ("It shall be the duty of
both the Buyer and the Seller, to include in their original articles of trade ... the
following specifications ... : (a) Date of Contract[;] (b) Quantity[;] (c) Kind and
Grade of Grain[;] (d) Price[;] (e) Type of inspection[;] (f) Type of weights[;] (g)
Applicable Trade Rules to apply[;] (h) Transportation specifications... [;] (i) Payment
Terms[; and] (j) Other terms."). There is also a rule dealing with the "battle of the
forms," the situation where each transactor sends a confirmatory memorandum but
the terms of the memoranda fail to agree. See NGFA GRAIN TRADE R. 6.
-' According to the NGFA case index, from 1975 to 1993, 42 cases dealt with
confirmations (primarily "battle of the forms" issues), 38 with custom of the trade,
37 with grades (quality difference), 30 with grades (method of inspection), 26 with
failure to deliver, and 19 with weight (type of weight to be employed).
" See, e.g., Owensboro Grain Co. v. David G. Cline, NGFA Case No. 1620 (1985)
("Failure to produce a crop [because of a drought] does not void a contract for grain
delivery, since that grain is available somewhere. It may be difficult to complete the
delivery. It will probably be costly to complete the delivery. But it is not impossi-
ble."); Monarch Feed Mills Inc. v. David McEntire, NGFA Case No. 1596 (1983)
(same). Interestingly, a desire to avoid the Code's provisions on commercial impracti-
cability, see U.C.C. § 2-615, is one reason that grain traders prefer to contract under
the NGFA system. See NGFA, PROTECTING, supra note 17, at 143 (listing the benefits
of arbitration over litigation, including the fact that "[t]he language... [of the UCC's
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In deciding cases, the NGFA arbitrators take a formalistic
approach to adjudication; they consistently refuse to look behind
the letter of a trade rule to discern and take into account the type
of behavior that the rule is intended to encourage or discourage.
33
The trade rules do not contain an explicit equivalent of the Code's
broad duty of good faith.' Although the term "good faith"
occasionally appears in NGFA opinions 5 and is sometimes used to
impracticability provision] actually confuses, rather than clarifies, the predictability
of the outcome in the court system. It is actually better in arbitration than in
court.").
Even when contracts include enforceable force majeure provisions, the industry-
wide norm in the event of a force majeure is to extend the time for contractual
performance or voluntarily tender damages for breach, rather than to claim excuse.
As one grain company executive explained, there is a sense that, as between
merchandisers who are both buyers and sellers in the market, a norm of never
declaring force majeure will work out fairly over time. He recounted one situation
where a seller declared force majeure on a number of contracts, due to a deep freeze
on several key inland waterways. The executive pointed out to the seller that if he
persisted in declaring force majeure in the instant situation, the executive's company
would be particularly quick to call force majeure on the seller's company in the first
instance where the transactors' positions were reversed. The seller immediately
withdrew his claim of force majeure and tendered the requisite compensatory
payment. See Interview with Grain Company Executive (Nov. 1995). As another
trader explained, in more colloquial terms, "Act of God? Whose Cod? I'm Catholic,
he's a Methodist." See Comment of a Panelist at the NGFA Agricultural Transporta-
tion Summit 1996 (May 1996).
s In Pillsbury Co. v. Cook Industries, NGFA Case No. 1530 (1977), for example,
the contract provided that official destination weights were to govern. At issue was
the validity of a destination weight determined by a clamshell unloader scale. The
plaintiff argued that the weight should be considered invalid, because NGFA Barge
Trade Rule 2 provided that "[g]rain loaded or unloaded[] by clamshell... shall not
be considered officially weighed." The defendant maintained that this rule applied
"only to older, inefficient versions" of the clamshell. Id. He argued that because the
weight of this particular scale was generally accepted by shippers, allowing its weights
to be accepted as official weights would be consistent with the rule's intent. The
arbitrators recognized that this scale's weights were commonly accepted in lieu of
official weights and that "this particular clamshell ... appeared efficient with
advanced engineering to provide accurate weights." Id. Nevertheless they held for
the plaintiff, explaining that "[i]f trade practices are changing, consideration should
be given to updat[ing] the rules to reflect such changes." Id. This aspect of the
opinion was upheld on appeal. See Cook Indus. v. Pillsbury Co., NGFA Arb. App.
Case No. 1530 (1977). The trade rule was ultimately amended.
See U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every Contract... imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance.... ."). The only reference to good faith in the NGFA Trade Rules
is in a technical provision dealing with the role of brokers. See NGFA GRAIN TRADE
R. 40.
' For example, "good faith" is sometimes mentioned in cases where one or both
parties alleged intentional wrongdoing by the other party. See, e.g., U. & L. Grain Co.
v. Continental Grain Co., NGFA Case No. 1528 (1976) (where the plaintiff alleged
that "possible substitution of corn in the one compartment [of a train car] by the
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signal the arbitrators' view of the propriety of a party's commer-
cial behavior, or to provide additional support for a result reached
on other grounds," violation of a general duty of good faith is
never the explicit basis of the arbitrators' decision."7 In a recent
case, NGFA held that acting in accordance with the trade rules
and the terms of the written contract is per se acting in "good
faith."38
NGFA arbitrators follow a strict hierarchy of authority, derived
receiver" might explain its "heating and sour" condition, the arbitrators found the
allegation of intentional wrongdoing unsupported and noted that, in handling the
settlement of the shipment, the defendant acted in "good faith"). Occasionally, the
arbitrators note that a party made an argument based on "good faith" but do not
mention it in stating the basis of their decision. See, e.g., Dillwyn Grain and Supply
Co. v. Farmers Commodities Corp., NGFA Case No. 1639 (1987) (noting that the
defendant maintained that it acted in "good faith," the arbitrators found in its favor
on other grounds).
' See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., NGFA Case Nos. 1568, 1570
(1982) ("question[ing] the validity of [a company's] statement of taking positive action
in good faith on the [date claimed]" because this date "would [have been] the very last
day ... to make shipment" under the Grain Trade Rules and the terms of the
contract); R.F. Cunningham & Co. v. Pennfield Corp., NGFA Case No. 1544 (1978)
(holding that a defendant who claimed that the plaintiff had submitted an inaccurate
weight certificate had no recourse because the plaintiff provided the type of
certificate required by the contract, and noting that the defendant "failed in good
faith to immediately notify the Plaintiff of such claimed shortage").
s' Notions of good faith and substantive fairness may, however, influence the
outcome of arbitration cases in ways that cannot be detected by reading opinions.
These considerations may subtly influence the arbitrators' factual findings in
outcome-determinative ways, particularly in situations where the case turns on the
credibility of conflicting oral testimony. Arbitrators' occasional references to good
faith as an additional justification for conclusions reached on alternative grounds
suggest that good faith is very much on their minds when they decide cases.
Preliminary interviews with arbitrators have so far failed to establish that good faith
influences outcomes. However, this may reflect nothing more than arbitrators'
reluctance to acknowledge that their decisions have been influenced by impermissible
factors. Because NGFA hearing transcripts and written filings are not available to the
public, it is impossible to determine definitively the extent to which good faith
influences arbitrators' decisions. It is clear, however, that NGFA arbitrators are
reluctant to appear to be ruling on the basis of good faith alone.
" See, e.g., Farmland Indus. v. Bartlett & Co., NGFA Case Nos. 1739, 1739B (1996)
(holding that because the defendant acted in accordance with both the contract's
written provisions and the trade rules, there was no issue of good faith under the
Code to consider, because "before going to an outside source, a dispute first must be
examined within the four corners of the document from which the dispute arises");
see also Farmland Indus. v. Benson-Quinn Co., NGFA Case Nos. 1737, 1737B (1996)
(rejecting a claim that defendants who had complied with all applicable contract and
trade rule provisions should nonetheless be found to have breached the Code's duty
of good faith and fair dealing); Farmland Indus. v. Bartlett & Co., NGFA Case Nos.
1732, 1732B (1996) (same).
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from both the trade rules3 9 and prior arbitration decisions.40  As
one opinion explained, the arbitrators'
first responsibility was to enforce the terms of the contract. When
the contract terms are insufficient on their own to decide the case,
arbitrators are to rely next upon the Trade Rules, and thirdly,
trade practice. Reliance upon the Uniform Commercial Code or
any other statutory basis usually comes only after the first three
sources have proved insufficient.4 '
In practice NGFA arbitrators rarely look to the Code or other legal
sources in deciding cases.
1. Usage of Trade
A review of all the NGFA opinions in which custom or usage of
trade was at issue between 1975 and 199542 suggests that NGFA
arbitrators adhere strictly to the Association's stated hierarchy of
authority. The NGFA tribunal does not permit unwritten customs
and usages of trade to vary or qualify the meaning of either trade
rules or explicit contractual provisions. Arbitrators use custom to
decide cases only when both the trade rules and the contract are
silent.4" Yet even when looking to custom to fill a true contractual
19 See NGFA GRAIN TRADE R. pmbl. ("All active members are free to agree upon
any contractual provisions which they deem appropriate and these rules apply only
to the extent that the parties to a contract have not altered the terms of the rules, or
the contract is silent as to a matter dealt with by the pertinent rule."); see also NGFA
BARGE FREIGHT TRADING R. pmbl. (same); NGFA BARGE TRADE R. pmbl. (same);
NGFA FEED TRADE R. pmbl. (same).
o NGFA opinions do not have precedential value. However, arbitrators
occasionally refer to earlier opinions. See, e.g., ConAgra Inc. v. Peavey Co., NGFA
Case No. 1559 (1981) (discussing the relevance of NGFA Case No. 1515's definition
of the boundaries of C.I.F. NOLA).
"' Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Peavey Co., NGFA Case No. 1690 (1992); see also William
Prahl v. Didion Inc., NGFA Case No. 1702 (1993) (same); Pillsbury Co. v. Louis
Dreyfus Corp., NGFA Case Nos. 1568, 1570 (1982) (same).
4 The discussion in the text is based on the opinions in 39 cases, decided between
1975 and 1995, that NGFA classified as involving issues relating to "custom of the
trade," as well as on the opinions in 12 additional cases that the Author, after
reviewing all of the opinions, classified as dealing, either explicitly or implicitly, with
custom or usage of trade. The NGFA arbitration opinions rendered between 1975
and 1995 can be found in NGFA, PROTECTING, supra note 17. The discussion also
draws on interviews with current and former NGFA arbitrators.
4' See, e.g., Coshoction Grain Co. v. Tim Geiger, NGFA Case No. 1752 (1996)
(acknowledging that both the contract and the trade rules were silent on the relevant
issue, the arbitrators ruled for the plaintiff on the ground that its actions were
"consistent with customary trade practice"); Montana Merchandising Inc. v. Penny-
Newman Grain Co., NGFA Case No. 1614 (1985) (applying "the custom of the trade
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gap, the arbitrators often signal their distaste for this type of
adjudication by admonishing the parties that the dispute might well
have been avoided had they written a sufficiently specific contract.
When custom conflicts with a trade rule or an explicit contractual
provision, the arbitrators decide the case on the basis of the trade
rule" or the contractual provision45 even when they are con-
vinced that the custom both exists and was known by the parties.
46
that billed weights are utilized" in a situation where the defendant failed to weigh
several cars in accordance with the terms of the contract and supplied weights that
the trade rules state are inapplicable in such a situation); Feeders Grain Co. v.
Italgrani U.S.A. Inc., NGFA Case No. 1575 (1982) (applying the "custom of the trade
that shipping points within an area with equal rates are applicable" in a situation
where the parties' confirmations differed in their specification of acceptable shipping
points and there was no trade rule on point); Pillsbury Co. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp.,
NGFA Case Nos. 1568, 1570 (1982) (noting that there were no relevant trade rules,
and looking to "trade custom" to determine "the accepted trade practice regarding
[the meaning of the] terminology"); Cargill Inc. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., NGFA Case
No. 1566 (1982) (noting that under the terms of the contract it was unclear whether
the defendant "had a right to [name] destinations not specified in the contract," and
holding that it did, explaining that while there was no trade rule on point "[t]here
seems to be ample precedent in historical trade customs and practices to affirm that
the Defendant did have a right to [name] alternative destinations from those
originally specified... assuming that the Defendant bears... 'transportation costs'
to do so"); Fred Webb Inc. v. B.M. Hancock & Sons Feed Mill Inc., NGFA Case No..
1549 (1979) (noting that the contract and the trade rules were silent and that the
parties agreed on the content of the relevant custom, the arbitrators took the custom
into account); Cargill Inc. v. Williams Grain Co., NGFA Case No. 1522 (1976) (noting
that because both the contract and the trade rules were silent on the relevant issues,
the arbitration committee "based its decision on the custom of the trade"); Bunge
Corp. v. Harold V. Tucker, NGFA Case No. 1517 (1975) (holding, in a situation
where there were no applicable trade rules, that "[tirade customs and practice
indicate that truck drivers delivering grain cannot be presumed agents for the
principal").
4 See, e.g., Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Early & Daniel Co., NGFA Case No. 1547 (1979)
(holding that while the plaintiff's buy-in might have been in accord with the "realistic
demands and customary understanding of the Evansville corn trade," it was
nonetheless improper because it did not accord with the letter of Grain Trade Rule
11); Willow Hill Grain Co. v. Tabor & Co., NGFA Case No. 1542 (1978) (granting the
plaintiffa price adjustment, explaining that "[w]hile defendant may have 'followed the
standard grain practice of settling the overfill,' it did not exactly follow Grain Trade
Rule 12(f)").
4 See, e.g., Attebury Grain Inc. v. Commodities Inc., Texas Grain & Feed Ass'n
Case No. 188 (1991) ("The committee recognizes that it is the custom of the trade to
not normally pay premiums for No. 1 Milo, however the terms of the explicit contract
take precedence over custom of the trade.").
" For example, in Bunge Corp. v. Agri Industries, NGFA Case Nos. 1586, 1587
(1983), the arbitrators agreed with the plaintiff's contention "that situations of this
nature [involving weather-related barge delays] are often worked out on an amicable
give-and-take-basis." Id. Nevertheless, they held for the defendant-buyers who
bought-in the freight and refused to extend the contracts, explaining:
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Despite NGFA's reluctance to rule on the basis of custom,
custom does play a number of subsidiary roles in NGFA decisions.
Opinions sometimes refer to custom as an additional justification
for a result reached on other, independent grounds, most common-
ly the application of a trade rule.4" Arbitrators also use custom to
assess the credibility of evidence and oral testimony.41 In addition,
The fact that other trades shipped at the same time and in the same
geographical area were extended by mutual consent proved that a great deal
of good will governs many of our trade relationships. But no one is
required to grant such extensions. The fact that some parties did agree to
such extensions certainly does not govern as a precedent for other trades.
Id.
There are a few cases where the language of the decision suggests that the
arbitrators are ruling on the basis of custom. However, a closer look at the facts of
these cases reveals that the same results could easily have been reached on the basis
of the trade rules alone. See, e.g., Continental Grain Co. v. Curtis Rodgers, NGFA
Case No. 1636 (1986) (dismissing the seller's claim that the buyer had breached the
contract by rejecting off-grade grain on the ground that "the custom of the trade is
that the buyer reserves the right whether to accept on contract poor-quality or off-
grade grain," without mentioning that the buyer's right to accept or reject off-grade
goods is clearly established in Grain Trade Rule 17); ConAgra Inc. v. BOS
Commodities, NGFA Case No. 1627 (1986) (ruling against a buyer claiming non-
conforming tender because he "did not comply with normal industry practice of
notifying the seller of its intention to buy-in against the contract," a result that could
also have been reached under the trade rules).
47 See Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. AGP Grain Coop., NGFA Case No. 1703 (1993)
(noting that "[i]n reaching a decision, the arbitrators focused on NGFA Grain Trade
Rule 31(b)," but also looked to "trade practice," although no particular practice was
identified); Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Farmers Grain Terminal Inc., NGFA Case No.
1663 (1990) (holding that the plaintiff-buyer waived his rights to reject a barge
because he did not inspect it "in a timely manner according to the NGFA Trade
Rules, the Uniform Commercial Code or the practices of the trade at that time");
FCX Inc. v. Paramount Poultry, Div. of Cargill Inc., NGFA Case No. 1623 (1985)
(noting that "[iun the trade and in official grading, coffeeweed seed is regarded as
foreign material"); Tabor Grain Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., NGFA Case No. 1555
(1980) (holding for the defendant and noting that the plaintiff's actions clearly
violated NGFA Grain Trade Rule 30 and were "beyond any reasonably accepted trade
practice"); Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp., NGFA Case
No. 1516 (1975) (holding that the plaintiff's confirmation, which was signed by the
defendant, made a particular tarifFs loading minimum applicable, but noting as well
that the tariff's minimums were also "an accepted trade practice unless otherwise
agreed upon").
"' See, e.g., Indiana Grain Div. of Ind. Farm Bureau Coops. Ass'n v.J & S Farms
Inc., NGFA Case No. 1645 (1988) (discounting the defendant's testimony that it
thought it was supposed to directly pay a supplier, rather than the seller, on the
grounds that "[i]t is not an industry practice for a buyer to bypass the party that sold
it grain so as to pay a third firm that was in line as a supplier"); DeBruce Grain Inc.
v. Cargill Inc., NGFA Case No. 1635 (1986) (attempting, in face of contradictory
evidence, to establish the date that a bill of lading was issued, the arbitrators took
into account "the custom of the trade [which] dictated that the earliest date of a bill
1996] 1779
1780 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1765
opinions sometimes discuss custom in an effort to signal the
arbitrators' view of the propriety of the parties' contracting
behavior." When the arbitrators are convinced that the trade
rules either do not reflect a common trade usage50 or are unwork-
able in practice,5 1 they will note this in their opinion along with a
suggestion that the Trade Rules Committee consider amending the
trade rules. The rules are sometimes amended following such
notations.
52
NGFA arbitrators may, however, implicitly take custom into
account in a way that cannot be detected by reading arbitration
opinions. Because NGFA arbitrators are experienced industry
members, it is likely that in interpreting contractual language they
instinctively give particular terms their "meaning in the trade" when
such a meaning truly exists.
of lading would be the load date of the barge and the latest date of a bill of lading
would be [the] pick-up date of the barge"); R.F. Cunningham & Co. v. Pennfield
Corp., NGFA Case No. 1544 (1978) (holding that the plaintiffwho had provided the
weight certificate required by the contract was entitled to be paid on the basis of the
certificate because it "faithfully fulfilled its part of the contract," while the weighing
method that the defendant used to attempt to establish a shortfall was suspect
because it was not even an "accepted trade practice").
4 9 See e.g., Continental Grain Co. v. Pingree Grain Co., NGFA Case No.
1554 (1980) (awarding the plaintiff damages for canceled contracts, but noting
that "[b]oth parties condoned and practiced a procedure of posting/applying
deliveries against contracts that violated standard methods customarily used by the
trade").
See Pillsbury Co. v. Cook Indus., NGFA Case No. 1530 (1977) ("If
trade practices are changing, consideration should be given to update the rules
to reflect such changes."); Cook Indus. v. Pillsbury Co., NGFA Arb. App. Case No.
1530 (1977) ("It is our collective opinion that the letter of the [trade] rule reigns ....
We recommend [that] dissensions with the rules manifest themselves before the fact
at the appropriate forums conducted with regularity by the Trade Rules Commit-
tee.").
"' See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc. v. Overby Grain Farms Inc., NGFA Case No. 1700
n.1 (1993) ("[T]he arbitrators have communicated to the NGFA's Trade Rules
Committee the dichotomy posed by NGFA Barge Trade Rule 2(g)(1) as it is now
written. The unloading buyer has the obligation to report the weight back to the
original shipper. But the original shipper may not have the contractual relationship
with the unloading buyer that would permit enforcement should the rule not be
followed."); Guthrie Corp. v. Continental Grain Co., NGFA Case No. 1673 n.1 (1992)
("The arbitrators believed that the NGFA's Trade Rules Committee should examine
whether a more specific definition of 'due diligence' in the Trade Rules would
minimize future disputes of this nature, and have communicated this view to the
committee.").
-2 For example, the Barge Trade Rule at issue in Cook Industries v. Pillsbury Co. was
subsequently amended. See supra note 33.
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2. Course of Performance and Course of Dealing
NGFA's attitude towards taking course of dealing and course of
performance53 into account is even more restrictive than its
attitude towards custom. Neither the trade rules nor NGFA's
common law hierarchy of authority mention course of dealing or
course of performance.'M Although arbitrators occasionally take
course of dealing or course of performance into account in filling
contractual gaps,55 these considerations are seldom the explicit
basis for arbitral decisions.56 In fact, some opinions have either
implicitly or explicitly excluded them as a basis of decision.
57
" The discussion of NGFA's approach to course of dealing and course of
performance is based on all of the NGFA opinions from 1975 to 1994 that the Author
classified as either explicitly or implicitly referring to these considerations.
' The only Grain Trade Rule that could be interpreted as referencing course of
dealing is Grain Trade Rule 2, which provides, in part, that "in cases where the Buyer
and Seller have been trading on agreed terms and conditions.., it shall be sufficient
for the words 'usual terms' to be used in confirmation, and the use of said words shall
imply that such terms and conditions as governed previous trades of a like character
shall apply." Over the past 20 years there have been no cases addressing the question
of whether the phrase "usual terms" includes course of dealing and/or course of
performance. However, because transactors must explicitly opt-in to this rule, it
certainly does not make these considerations relevant to contract interpretation more
generally. In addition, transactors rarely conclude deals under this section because
they fear that arbitrators will interpret the rule to include course of dealing and
course of performance, which would, in their view, make the terms of the deal far too
uncertain. See Interview with Grain Company Executive (Sept. 1995).
- See National Farms Inc. v. Bearhouse Inc., NGFA Case No. 1589 (1983) (noting
that the contracts "did not specify the type of weights or grades to be furnished," the
arbitrators implicitly ruled on the basis of course of dealing, explaining that because
"[p]revious trades were completed on destination terms ... [such terms] must be
assumed in this case").
' In one highly unusual case, however, a course of performance was found to
trump an explicit contractual provision. In Rickel Inc. v. Agra Grain Corp., NGFA
Case No. 1665 (1990), one issue was whether particular shipments of corn were
within the grade specifications of the contract. Although the contract contained a
provision specifying a minimum acceptable grade of corn and many of the shipments
whose quality was at issue were indisputably below this grade, the arbitrators found
the corn to be applicable on the contract. They explained that before the dispute
arose and relations between the parties deteriorated, there was "no evidence to
suggest that any loads [of below contract grade corn] were rejected," and that, as a
consequence, "[t]he behavior of the parties indicated that the minimum grade
specified in the contract did not actually apply." Id. One possible explanation for the
arbitrators' willingness to deviate from the established rule of giving primacy to the
express terms in a contract in this case is that the minimum grade clause in the
contract was so unusual that the arbitrators found it unlikely, particularly in face of
their contrary actions, that the parties intended the term to have its apparent
meaning. See Interview with Grain Company Executive (Sept. 1995).57 See, e.g., Peavey Grain Co. v. Cargill Inc., NGFA Case No. 1669 (1991) (rejecting
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Nevertheless, course of dealing and course of performance do play
a role in NGFA arbitrations. They are sometimes taken into
account in assessing the credibility of evidence or testimony,s5 and
are occasionally mentioned in opinions as additional justifications
for results that the arbitrators can or do justify on other, indepen-
dent grounds.59
On occasion, the arbitrators give weight to a type of contextual
evidence that does not fit neatly into any of the Code's categories:
namely, evidence that a party has an established business practice
that it routinely follows in particular types of transactions. When
evidence of an established business practice is presented, it creates
a strong, although not irrebuttable, presumption that the party
followed the practice in the particular case.6
B. The Code's Adjudicative Approach
On a formal level, the Code's hierarchy of authority is similar
to NGFA's. The Code accords the greatest weight to "express
terms of an agreement," followed by course of performance,
61
the seller's suggestion that the buyer should be compelled to accept a lesser-quality
grade certificate on the second shipment because he had done so on the first
shipment); Tabor & Co. v. Cargill Inc., NGFA Case No. 1520 (1976) (noting that the
defendant used a less reliable type of inspection than was provided for in the
contracts, the arbitrators gave no weight to the "submitted proof that [the plaintiff]
had accepted such inspections on other barges before, during and after the period
of occurrence").
' See, e.g., Little Egypt Grain Co. v. Consolidated Grain and Barge Co., NGFA
Case No. 1674 (1991) (finding the plaintiff's claim not to have received the
defendant's confirmation not credible, in part because "[t]he parties' prior course of
dealing with one another revealed that the defendant had sent confirmation letters
... in the past ... [in this type of transaction, but that] the plaintiff•., did not
routinely send confirmations.. . in ... dealings between the parties").
"9 See, e.g., Fred Webb Inc. v. Cargill Inc., NGFA Case No. 1691 (1993) (noting
that the parties' contract was vague, calling only for "'destination' grades," the
arbitrators held for the defendant on the ground that it had provided a type of
destination grade and that the type of grade it submitted had been used "to settle
shipments in prior trades").
o See, e.g., Fred Webb Inc. v. General Mills Inc., NGFA Case No. 1583 (1982)
(where seller signed without objection buyer-mill's confirmation, which required the
wheat to be of "milling quality," and a dispute arose as to the meaning of the term,
the arbitrators found the buyer-miller's more stringent definition of "milling quality"
to be applicable, explaining that "[i]t is customary practice for mills to set standards
in buying wheat with commercially more stringent requirements than those
determined to be actionable by the FDA").
61 See U.C.C. § 2-208(1) ("Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions
for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
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course of dealing,62 usage of trade,6- and, finally, the Code's own
gap-fillers." In practice, however, unlike NGFA arbitrators, courts,
in a variety of doctrinal guises that are either explicitly or implic-
itly authorized by the Code,65 often allow these considerations to
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.").
62 See id. § 1-205(1) ("A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct.").
63 Under the Code, a trade usage is "any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." Id. § 1-205(2).
A trade usage need not be universally followed. "[F]ull recognition is ... available
for ... usages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even
though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree." Id. § 1-205 cmt. 5. The
existence and scope of a usage are to be proved as fact. This is ordinarily done
through the introduction of affidavits or testimony from industry experts. See, e.g.,
Harlow &Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770, 773 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(introducing the testimony of two employees and "two disinterested local steel
importers" in an effort to establish "an accepted steel importing trade usage ... [that]
shipment in September-October means delivery in October-November"). It mayalso
be done through introduction of a trade code or industry-promulgated quality-
standards specifications. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 5 (noting that "there is room...
for proper recognition of usage agreed upon by merchants in trade codes"); Foxco
Indus. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 985 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that the
Knitted Textile Association's standards were a trade usage because "uncontroverted
testimony" established that the association was "an industry group with over 1500
members"). It is, however, important to note that the mere existence of a trade code
is not enough to establish a usage. See, e.g.,JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-3, at 140 & nn.40-41 (3d practitioners' ed. 1988)
(discussing the complications that may arise when trade codes are introduced to
establish usages and citing cases).
" See U.C.C. § 1-205(4) ("The express terms of an agreement and an applicable
course of dealing and usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms
control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls
usage of trade."); id. § 2-208(2) ("[E]xpress terms shall control course of performance
and course of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade
.... "); id. § 1-205 cmt. 4 (explaining that "those rules of law (such as those in Part
3 of Article 2 on Sales) which fill in points which the parties have not considered and
in fact agreed upon ... yield to contrary agreement of the parties ... [which
includes] the usages of trade which furnish the background and give particular
meaning to the language used, and are the framework of common understanding
controlling any general rules of law which hold only when there is no such
understanding").
' See, e.g., id. § 1-205(3) ("A course of dealing between parties and any usage of
trade... [should be used to] give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify
the terms of an agreement."); id. § 2-208(1) ("[A]ny course of performance accepted
or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.").
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vary or trump the express terms of a written contract. In some
instances these considerations are permitted to take precedence
over express terms on the grounds that they do not contradict, but
rather clarify, qualify, or supplement, the express terms of the
written agreement.6 In other instances, such as where the con-
tract's express provisions are silent on an issue or the agreement
itself was formed through a course of performance, these consider-
ations are sometimes found to supply additional contractual
provisions. In addition, they are frequently introduced to
establish an industry-specific meaning of a word or phrase that may
or may not have a clear lay meaning."8 The industry-specific
meaning is then given precedence over the lay meaning. Finally,
"In Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981),
a contract for the sale of asphalt contained an explicit provision which stated that the
seller's posted price at the time of delivery would govern. However, the buyer
claimed that it was entitled to "price protection" under a usage of the asphalt-paving
trade in Hawaii that required the seller to sell at the original price all the asphalt that
the buyer had committed to use injobs on which it had already bid in reliance on the
seller's price. See id. at 777. The court held for the buyer, explaining that "the jury
could have reasonably construed price protection as consistent with the express
term." Id. at 780; see also Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 7 (4th
Cir. 1971) (holding that, despite express price and quantity terms and a standard
integration clause, evidence to show that it was a custom and usage of the fertilizer
industry that "express price and quantity terms in contracts for materials in the mixed
fertilizer industry are mere projections to be adjusted according to market forces" was
admissible to establish a consistent additional term to the parties' written contract);
American Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592,597 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) ("The trend has been for judges, looking beyond written contract
terms to reach the 'true understanding' of the parties, to extend themselves to
reconcile trade usage and course of dealing with seemingly contradictory express
terms. They have permitted course of dealing and usage of trade to add terms, cut
down on or subtract terms, or lend special meaning to contract language."); Modine
Mfg. Co. v. North E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837-38 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)
(holding that although the contract provided that air-conditioning cooling "capacities
shall not be less than indicated," it was nevertheless reversible error to exclude
evidence that in the air-conditioning industry it was customary for "reasonable
variations in cooling capacity [to be] considered to comply with specifications");
WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 3-3, at 136 (concluding that "the provision that
express terms control inconsistent course of dealing and its cohorts [namely, course
of performance and usage of trade] really cannot be taken at face value, at least in
some courts").
6 See, e.g., Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745-46
(1995) (finding that "there was some form of implied-in-fact operating contractual
agreement" that arose from the parties' "course of conduct," the court held that
evidence of usage of trade was admissible to establish a term of the contract, but
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the evidence
offered to establish the usage was "insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact").
6' See, e.g., Foxco Indus. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir. 1979)
(looking to trade usage to define the term "first quality goods").
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because the Code provides that "course of performance shall be
relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent
with such course of performance," 69 course of performance may
have the effect of removing an express written term from an
agreement.
Course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade
also influence commercial adjudication through a host of other
Code provisions that direct courts to look to commercial practic-
es,70 and through the Code's "good faith" provision, 71 which, as
the Official Comment notes, "directs a court towards interpreting
contracts within the commercial context in which they are created,
performed and enforced." 2
On a formal level, the Code gives transactors a way to limit the
applicability of these provisions, but in practice it is difficult for
them to do so with sufficient certainty. Transactors may contract
around a usage by specifically negating the usage," but simply
including a specific term dealing with the same aspect of the
contracting relationship as the usage is insufficient to negate it.74
69 U.C.C. § 2-208(3); see also WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 1-6, at 67 ("[I]f,
in light of a 'relevant' course of performance, either a waiver or a modification ...
is ... shown, it is not inappropriate to say that course of performance 'controls' and
thus alters the express term."). The Official Comment to UCC § 2-208 creates a bias
towards interpreting a course of performance as a waiver. It provides that "[w]here
it is difficult to determine whether a particular act merely sheds light on the meaning
of the agreement or represents a waiver of a term of the agreement, the preference
is in favor of 'waiver' whenever such construction ... is needed to preserve the
flexible character of commercial contracts." U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 3.
70 See supra note 2 (citing Code provisions).
1 U.C.C. § 1-203. Because the Code provides that the duty of good faith cannot
be "disclaimed by agreement," id. § 1-102(3), and the Official Comment provides that
the good faith provision is to be "implemented by Section 1-205 on course of dealing
and usage of trade," id. § 1-203 cmt., it is unlikely that transactors will be able to
entirely contract out of the Code's approach to adjudication.
2 Id. § 1-203 cmt.
See id. § 2-202 cmt. 2 ("Unless carefully negated, [usages of trade] have become
an element of the meaning of the words used.").
74 See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 805 (9th
Cir. 1981) (permitting a usage to be introduced to vary an explicit contract provision
dealing with the same aspect of the transaction as the usage); Columbia Nitrogen
Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 10-11 (4th Cir. 1971) (same); Modine Mfg. Co. v.
North E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833,840 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (same). Courts'
reluctance to find that express written provisions negate a usage dealing with the
same aspect of the transaction as the written provision may be due, in part, to UCC
§ 1-205(4), which provides that "[t]he express terms of an agreement and an
applicable ... usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other." Id.
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Similarly, while the Code explicitly permits transactors to include a
provision that "excludes modification or rescission except by a
signed writing,"7 5 courts sometimes permit the provisions them-
selves to be modified by a course of performance. 7  In addition,
courses of performance that do not amount to modifications are
sometimes held to be waivers." Although transactors can retract
a waiver of an executory portion of the contract by "reasonable
notification," unless doing so "would be unjust in view of a material
change of position [by the other transactor] in reliance on the
waiver,""8 it is difficult to predict when courts will find reliance.
Furthermore, even if the waiver is properly retracted, the course of
performance may remain "relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement. "79
U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
' See, e.g., Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So. 2d 966,968 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (holding, despite a clear provision requiring all modifications to be in
writing, that "the parties to a contract may modify the written agreement by
subsequent oral agreement or course of dealing with one another despite the
requirement of a writing in order to modify," and here "the evidence as to the
parties' conduct supports finding both a waiver of the requirement that subsequent
modifications be in writing signed by both parties and that a subsequent modification
occurred"); see also Fairfax Leary,Jr. & David Frisch, Uniform Commercial Code Annual
Survey: General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 39 BUS. LAW.
1851, 1861 (1984) ("If the parties agree in writing that they will modify their
agreement only by a written modification, they ought not be able to modify orally.
However, the waiver provision in UCC section 2-209(4) is so broad that it virtually
nullifies such a clause in the written contract. Moreover, the parties' post-contracting
conduct can indicate their mutual intent to modify .... ").
" See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280,1287
(7th Cir. 1986) (holding, in face of a no-oral-modification clause, that an attempt to
modify the contract through conduct could operate as a waiver if the promisor "has
actually incurred a cost, has relied"); Knoxville Rod & Bearing, Inc. v. Bettis Corp.,
672 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the contract contained a
clause prohibiting modifications not in writing, the court held that while defendant's
course of performance could not constitute an enforceable modification, it
nevertheless did amount to a waiver); see also Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton,
645 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[Tlhe weight of authority ... is that an 'anti-
waiver' clause, like any other term in the contract, is itself subject to waiver or
modification by course of performance and that whether such a waiver or modifica-
tion has occurred is a question for the fact-finder."); U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4
("Subsection (4) [dealing with modification] is intended, despite the provisions of
subsections (2) [authorizing clauses requiring modifications to be in writing] and (3)
[statute of frauds] to prevent contractual provisions excluding modification except by
a signed writing from limiting in other respects the legal effect of the parties' actual
later conduct. The effect of such conduct as a waiver is further regulated in
subsection (5).").
s U.C.C. § 2-209(5).
Id. § 2-208(1).
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Thus, there are a number of ways that courts permit course of
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade to trump
express written terms and limit transactors' ability to reliably
exclude these considerations from the interpretive process.
Although some courts give greater emphasis to the contract's
written terms,"0 their decisions are in tension with the Code's
underlying adjudicative approach, its definition of agreement, its
broad "duty of good faith," and its lax version of the parol evidence
rule, which permits these considerations to be introduced to explain
or supplement even a complete and integrated writing."s In
practice, the Code's adjudicative approach is far closer to a
mandatory, rather than a default, adjudicative approach.
C. Conclusion
The striking differences between NGFA's adjudicative philoso-
phy, a philosophy chosen by sophisticated merchant-transactors, and
the philosophy embedded in the Code, a philosophy Llewellyn
designed to be accommodating to merchant concerns, suggests that
it would be interesting to consider the reasons that sophisticated
merchant-transactors might find it advantageous to opt for a NGFA-
type adjudicative philosophy.
II. THE THEORY OF LEGALLY UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS
In order to understand why sophisticated merchant-transactors
might find a NGFA-type adjudicative philosophy desirable, it is
useful to focus on an observation that has been documented in the
law and society literature, namely that the contours of transactors'
contracting relationship may not be the same as the scope of the
rights and duties memorialized in their written, legally enforceable
contract.82 In many contexts, transactors accept late payment, vary
' See Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mabelton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp.
581, 583-84 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (noting that the "contract set[] out fairly specific
quantity, price, and time specifications," the court held that "to allow such specific
contracts to be challenged by extrinsic evidence mightjeopardize the certainty of the
contractual duties which parties have a right to rely on," explaining that "[c]ertainly
customs or trade should be relevant to the interpretation of certain terms of a
contract ... but this court does not believe that Section 2-202 was meant to invite a
frontal assault in the essential terms of a clear and explicit contract"), aff'd, 569 F.2d
1154 (5th Cir. 1978).
" See U.C.C. § 2-202 & cmts.; see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 2-10,
at 115 (discussing the parol evidence rule).
82 See, e.g., 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 512 (1995)
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quantity terms, assume new obligations, waive covenants, and adjust
prices in ways that their written contracts do not require. They may
be moved to do so by social norms, commercial custom, a "concern
for relationships, trust, honor and decency,"8 3 or fear of nonlegal
sanctions such as reputational damage or termination of a beneficial
relationship.a In some instances, these actions may be responses
to new circumstances, while in others they may reflect transactors'
decisions to abide by the extralegal commitments that supplement
their written contracts. This Part discusses the reasons that rational
transactors might deliberately leave aspects of their contracting
relationship to be governed, in whole or in part, by extralegal
commitments and sanctions. If transactors either act or intend to
act in ways that differ from their understanding of the express terms
of their written contract, their actions are no longer, as the Code
assumes, an accurate guide to their view of the meaning of their
written agreement.
In structuring their contracting relationship, transactors allocate
aspects of their relationship between the legal and extralegal realms
in ways that seek to maximize the value of their transaction.
8 5
(presenting evidence from interviews with business people in a wide variety of
industries to substantiate the observation that "[e]ven where lawyers prepare
elaborate contractual documents, often the business people who carry out the
transaction follow conventional practices rather than reading the written contract");
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminay Study, 25 AM.
SOC. REV. 55 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Preliminary Study] (discussing the ways that
manufacturing firms and their buyers depart from the terms of their express
contracts in their everyday interactions); Rock & Wachter, supra note 10 (noting that
employers systematically act in ways that are not required by their at-will employment
contracts with their employees); James J. White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial
Transactions: An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1
(1982) (noting that in a time of shortage in the chemical industry, chemical
companies arguably did not allocate their production strictly in accordance with the
dictates of UCC § 2-615, but rather in accord with other aspects of the underlying
transactional relationships).
'nJay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC'Y L.J.
43, 52 (1993).
' See Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 10, at 379-90 (giving an overview of
nonlegal sanctions).
' See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of 'Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. EcON. REv. 356, 358 (1980) ("Most actual contractual
arrangements consist of a combination of explicit- and implicit-enforcement
mechanisms. Some elements ofperformance will be specified and enforced by third-
party sanctions. The residual elements of performance will be enforced without
invoking the power of some outside party to the transaction but merely by the threat
of termination of the transactional relationship. The details of any particular contract
will consist of forms of these general elements chosen to minimize transaction
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Sometimes transactors allocate aspects of their contracting relation-
ship to the extralegal realm because the transaction costs of
including a sufficiently well-specified written provision in their
contract would exceed the benefits. 6  Other times, they do so
because nonlegal sanctions such as reputation bonds are strong
enough in the relevant market to ensure that an obligation will be
performed, making a legally enforceable provision unnecessary.
Transactors may also fail to include written provisions dealing
with a particular contingency because each may fear that the other
will interpret a suggestion that they do so as a signal that the
transactor proposing the provisions is unusually litigious or likely to
resist flexible adjustment of the relationship if circumstances
change.17 These potential relational costs of proposing additional
explicit provisions may result in aspects of a contracting relationship
costs.").
" In some contexts, however, the transaction costs of entering into an extralegal
agreement might be greater than the transaction costs of entering into a legally
enforceable contract.
Because the ability of the promisee to enforce an extralegal contract [often]
depends on the posting of a reputation bond by the promisor, each of the
parties must bear the 'information cost' of determining whether the other
party is trustworthy before negotiation over the terms of the agreement
even begins. This cost may be substantial and will depend, at least in part,
on the size, structure, and terms of the proposed transaction as well as on
the likelihood that the parties will have occasion to deal with one another
again in the near future. In general, the magnitude of precontract
transaction costs incurred in the formation of extralegal contracts will
depend on how common such contracts are in the relevant market.
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industy, 21 J. LECAL STUD. 115, 132-33 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Diamonds].
"' In some contracting contexts, transactors approach the task of reducing their
relationship to a written contract
with an idea of how similar transactions are usually structured; they have in
their minds an implicit form contract made up of clauses such as price that
are commonly negotiated, boilerplate provisions,... legal default rules [and
extralegal provisions]. A party may be wary of suggesting too many
deviations from the implicit form contract since this might be interpreted
as a signal that he is a less reliable or more contentious trading partner than
the average market participant .... [Tihis signal might, in turn, lead the
other party to either propose additional provisions or demand a price
adjustment to compensate him for the added perceived risk that a dispute
will arise. It might also increase the risk of transaction breakdown as well
as the likelihood that the transaction will not be consummated by the
relevant deadline.
Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC'Y L.J. 59,
71-72 (1993).
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being allocated to the extralegal realm, particularly in contexts
where the post-contract-formation relationship between the
transactors is highly relational in nature so that transactors'
perceptions of the value of the transaction will be strongly affected
by the attitudinal signals sent during pre-contractual negotiation.
88
Another reason that transactors may allocate aspects of their
relationship to the extralegal realm is that the legal system costs of
including a provision in their contract are too high. Legal system
costs are those costs that arise from the fact that litigation is costly,
prone to delay, and subject to judicial error.8 9 In computer
software markets, for example, legal system costs are an important
reason that both manufacturers and consumers may be better off if
shrink-wrap agreements disclaim all warranties and state that no
licenses will be granted, but manufacturers promise, in some legally
unenforceable way, to fix defective products and grant licenses
where appropriate. As one manufacturer whose shrink-wrap
contained broad warranty disclaimers and restrictive license
provisions explained:
[M]ost software houses are willing to be less restrictive in practice,
but with suits being brought for almost any reason, valid and
otherwise, and with such suits being expensive to defend ...
[s]oftware houses will probably continue to use similar wording in
warranties and licenses, if for no other reason than to avoid
attorney fees rather than responsibility."
In this context, if manufacturers used provisions that stated more
precisely when licenses would be granted and the software repaired,
the legal system costs associated with these provisions would
increase the price of the product. The provisions would increase
" As one grain merchandiser explained, "there are some aspects of a deal that
aren't written down because there is a sense that they are better dealt with as
gentlemen on an as-needed basis. I would be reluctant to deal with someone who
wanted to include such things in his confirmatory memoranda." See Interview with
Grain Merchandiser (Mar. 1996).
89For a comprehensive discussion of legal system costs and their effect on the
drafting of comnlercial contracts, see Edward A. Bernstein, Law &Economics and the
Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law 6' Economics
Literature, 74 0R. L. REV. 189 (1995).
9o R. David Otten, Warranty Pirates, BYTE, Mar. 1983, at 22, 22 (letter to the
editor). This incident was first discussed in CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,272 n.24, 295-96 (1985) (recounting this incident
as "a classic example of the use of ill-fitting formulations" that are often included in
contracts primarily because their meaning has been clearly established through
litigation).
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the likelihood that manufacturers would have to defend against
nuisance suits and would create a substantial risk that, even if a
manufacturer met its obligations, a court might err and force it to
pay a large judgment. Legal system costs would also make such
provisions of limited benefit to consumers, who would, in most
instances, find them prohibitively expensive to enforce. In the
software market, the trade press makes it relatively easy for
consumers to get information about manufacturers' reputations for
repairing their products and granting licenses. As a consequence,
both manufacturers and consumers may prefer lower-priced
software with broad disclaimers and the manufacturer's extralegal,
reputation-bond-backed promise to grant licenses and repair
products in appropriate circumstances to higher-priced software
with detailed, legally enforceable warranty and. license provisions.
In general, the potential legal system costs created by the use of
written contractual provisions are an important reason that
transactors may prefer to deal with aspects of their relationship
through extralegal agreements.
Finally, one of the most important reasons that transactors
allocate aspects of their agreement to the legal or extralegal realm
turns on the distinction between observable and verifiable informa-
tion. Observable information is information that it is both possible
and worthwhile for transactors to obtain. Verifiable information is
information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to a
designated third-party neutral in the event of a dispute.9 Transac-
tors will only find it worthwhile to include written provisions in
their contract that condition on information that is both observable
and verifiable.92 Provisions that would condition on information
that is only observable would be allocated to the extralegal realm.
In many contracting contexts, particularly those where nonlegal
sanctions are effective, transactors can make their contracting
relationship more complete, and hence more valuable, by supple-
91 See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements andJudicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 279 (1992).
9 Although most information that is verifiable is also observable, some verifiable
information may not be observable. For example, while the lost-profits component
of expectation damages may be verifiable by a court with the power to compel
discovery, it may not be observable by transactors attempting to cooperatively resolve
a dispute outside of litigation. This may be one reason that in settling disputes
among themselves, transactors often settle for reliance damages even though they
have entered into contracts that entitle them to recover expectation damages. See
infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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menting their written contract with extralegal provisions that
condition on observable information and cover additional contin-
gencies.
Consider, for example, a contract obligating a tool and die
maker (S) to produce and sell specially manufactured toy-machine
attachments to a toy manufacturer (B), who will use the attachments
to adapt his basic machinery to produce different types of toys.9"
Suppose that the attachments may break due to either operator
error or a defect in the attachment, that S is the lowest-cost
provider of repairs, and that while both S's repair technicians and
B's machine operators can determine the cause of a particular
breakdown with reasonable accuracy, it would be difficult and/or
expensive to establish the cause of a particular breakdown in
court.94 In such a situation, it would be desirable for S to both
produce and repair the attachments. However, a legally enforceable
provision requiring S to repair all breakdowns for free might not
give B an adequate incentive to prevent operator error, and a
provision requiring B to pay for all repairs might not give S an
adequate incentive to produce well-made attachments. Ideally, the
transactors would like to include a repair provision in their contract
obligating S to repair breakdowns due to defects at no charge and
breakdowns due to operator error at its usual repair fee. However,
because the cause of a particular breakdown is unverifiable-that is,
it cannot be proven in court with sufficient accuracy at a reasonable
cost-it will not be desirable for the transactors to include a legally
enforceable repair provision that makes their respective obligations
conditional on the cause of a breakdown. Nevertheless, because the
cause of a breakdown is observable, the transactors may find it
desirable to enter into a legally enforceable contract without a
repair provision and to supplement it with a legally unenforceable
" This stylized example is loosely based on the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation's contracting practices, which provide a real-world illustration of the
ways that legal system costs and the distinction between observable and verifiable
information affect the choice of contract terms and transaction structure. See Scott
E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United Statea Versus United Shoe Machiney Corporation:
On the Merits, 36J.L. & ECON. 33, 62-63 (1993) (discussing the reasons why United
Shoe leased many of its machines to shoe manufacturers and routinely repaired the
machines when they broke, even though the leases did not obligate them to do so).
' The cause of a breakdown may be unverifiable because courts have limited
knowledge about machine repairs, the existence of the dispute means that the two
witnesses with the best information are likely to give contradictory testimony, and
evidence might be difficult to preserve because the machinery must promptly be
repaired and returned to use.
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agreement containing the same terms as the ideal repair provision.
Assuming that toy manufacturers frequently buy attachments from
the same tool and die maker, S's desire to retain B's business would
give him an incentive to repair all broken attachments but to charge
B only when the breakdown was due to operator error. Conversely,
B would have an incentive to pay for all repairs necessitated by
operator error. If B did not pay for repairs in appropriate circum-
stances, S might refuse to do business with him in the future. B
would then have to bear the costs of switching to another tool and
die maker who knows less about B's production processes and basic
machinery, and about whose reputation for making repairs B has
little or no information. Thus, by conditioning on observable but
unverifiable information, the extralegal repair agreement, supported
by the nonlegal sanction of each transactor's threat to terminate a
mutually beneficial relationship, makes the transactors' agreement
more complete. It adds value to the transaction because S receives
a higher price for his machines than he would in the absence of the
agreement and B receives repairs from the cheapest, and perhaps
best, provider of these services.
The distinction between observable and verifiable information
also suggests another reason that transactors may want to conclude
a deal with two well-developed sets of contractual provisions, one
legally enforceable and one purely extralegal. At the outset of a
contracting relationship, a transactor may not know if the person
with whom he is dealing is trustworthy. Although he would find it
ideal to include two sets of written provisions, one that would apply
if the transactor turned out to be trustworthy and another if he
turned out to be untrustworthy, trustworthiness is not something
the contract can condition on because it is unverifiable. As a
consequence, the transactor may find it desirable to include terms
in the contract that are the best terms if the other transactor turns
out to be untrustworthy, while making extralegal commitments,
many of which will, over time, ripen into self-enforcing agree-
ments,95 that will govern the relationship if the other party turns
out to be trustworthy.9 6  In these transactional contexts, the
9 A contract is said to be self-enforcing if a promisor who is contemplating breach
would, upon reflection, find it in her own best interest to perform rather than breach,
even in the absence of sanctions imposed by a third party. See Benjamin Klein &
Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89J.
POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
' Consider, for example, a feed transaction where at the outset a buyer (B) does
not know if the seller (S) with whom he is dealing is trustworthy. In such a situation,
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written contract functions as a "bond," while the extralegal
relational agreement provides the terms of the contract-governance
structure.
97
Thus, while the Code's adjudicative approach is based on the
idea that "the course of actual performance by the parties is
considered the best indication of what they intended the[ir] writing
to mean,""8 there are a number of reasons that rational transactors
may prefer to act or agree to act in ways that they know are
different from the rights and obligations memorialized in their
written legally enforceable contract. It is therefore important to
reconsider the desirability of the Code's definition of agreement by
exploring its effects on commercial relationships under the more
realistic assumption that there is no necessary relationship between
transactors' actions and the intended meaning of the terms of their
written contract.
The Code's definition of agreement may impose an efficiency
loss on transactors relative to a NGFA-type system that systematical-
ly refuses to enforce extralegal agreements. By elevating usage of
trade, course of dealing, and course of performance to the status of
legally enforceable contract provisions, and commercial context to
the status of an over-arching interpretive framework, the Code
brings a substantial portion of the extralegal realm of contractual
relationships within the purview of legal enforceability. This makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for transactors to enter into purely
extralegal agreements. If transactors rationally prefer to structure
their transaction to include a combination of legal and extralegal
obligations, but the Code prevents them from entering into purely
extralegal agreements, transactors will be unable to select their
B might find it ideal to include a provision requiring an untrustworthy S to provide
a federally supervised weight certificate, and a provision permitting a trustworthy S
to provide only his own unsupervised in-house weights, an option that results in
significant cost savings because federally supervised weight certificates are expensive
to obtain. However, because S's trustworthiness is unverifiable, B might find it
desirable to include a provision in the contract requiring federally supervised weights,
the best term if S turns out to be untrustworthy, while making an extralegal
commitment to accept S's in-house weights if S turns out to be, and remains,
trustworthy.
" The literature on nonlegal sanctions views them as substitutes for, or
supplements to, legally enforceable contracts. In many merchant contexts, however,
it may be more accurate to view a legally enforceable contract as a set of obligations
that define the right to get an award of damages, a bond whose primary function is
to enhance the value of the extralegal agreement that specifies the terms the
transactors actually want to be performed.
98 U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
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preferred mix of legal and extralegal terms. They may therefore be
worse off than they would be in a NGFA-type system.
More specifically, because the risk of adjudicative error is
greater when courts enforce extralegal provisions than it is when
they enforce written provisions,"9 the Code's approach may induce
transactors to include written provisions memorializing the terms of
agreements that they would prefer to be extralegal. Alternatively,
if the cost of memorializing the desired extralegal agreement in the
written contract would be prohibitively high, perhaps because the
extralegal agreement seeks to condition on observable but unverifi-
able information or because the relational cost of negotiating the
relevant language would be significant, the Code's approach may
lead transactors to forgo both the explicit contractual provisions
and the extralegal agreement, thereby decreasing the total value of
the transaction."°° Conversely, because the Code's search for the
transactors' "bargain in fact" and its contextualized interpretive
approach often weaken the force of a contract's written provisions,
there may be provisions or types of provisions that transactors
would find it worthwhile to negotiate and draft if they would be
enforced as written that they would not find it worthwhile to
negotiate and draft if they thought a court would interpret the
provisions "in context."
Thus, because the Code's broad definition of agreement erodes
the distinction between legal and extralegal commitments and
prevents transactors from selecting their preferred mix of legal and
extralegal terms, it will have undesirable effects on commercial
relationships. However, in order to fully understand the ways that
the Code's adjudicative approach affects commercial relationships,
it is important to look in more detail at the Code's usage of trade,
course of performance, and course of dealing provisions. These
provisions are at the heart of the Code's interpretive approach and
play a central role in the court's search for both "immanent business
norms" and the parties' "bargain in fact."
" It may be difficult for courts to determine the content of extralegal agreements.
Transactors often allocate aspects of their relationship to the extralegal realm
precisely because an obligation is difficult to describe with sufficient specificity or
conditions on unverifiable information. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
" If, however, an aspect of a contracting relationship is allocated to the extralegal
realm only because the negotiating and drafting costs are high, transactors may be
better off if, in the event of a dispute, the court enforces their extralegal understand-
ing.
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HI. TRADE USAGE, COURSE OF PERFORMANCE, AND
COURSE OF DEALING
The effects of the Code's trade usage, course of performance,
and course of dealing provisions on commercial relationships can
only be understood by focusing on what courts observe when they
attempt to give content to these provisions in a particular case.
When courts apply the Code's trade usage provision and look at
how a majority of market transactors deal with an issue, or apply the
course of dealing or course of performance provisions and look at
how particular transactors have dealt with an issue, they will, in
many instances, be observing the norms that transactors choose to
follow when they cooperatively resolve disputes among themselves
and want to preserve their relationship ("relationship-preserving
norms," or "RPNs"). Some RPNs are "performance norms," which
reflect the implicit extralegal terms transactors have agreed to abide
by as long as they continue to trust one another and/or value
potential future dealings. Other RPNs are "dispute-resolution
norms,"101 norms that transactors follow in attempting to coopera-
tively resolve disputes in a manner that will not jeopardize future
dealings. Even when these RPNs are clear and well-developed, they
may be quite different from the terms of transactors' written
contracts, which contain the norms that transactors would want a
third-party neutral to apply in a situation where they were unable to
cooperatively resolve a dispute and viewed their relationship as
being at an end-game stage ("end-game norms," or "EGNs").
1° 2
There are two types of end-game stages. The first is an absolute
end-game where the parties, perhaps because of the action giving
rise to the alleged breach, have decided not to deal with one
another again.0 3 The second is an end-game round, a situation
"' When courts look to dispute-resolution norms, they will be observing the
norms followed in both relationship-preserving and end-game negotiation. However,
to the extent that parties to an end-game dispute anticipate that a court will take
customary RPNs into account, they may reach settlements that are strongly
influenced, if not determined, by these norms. This further reinforces the apparent
prevalence of RPNs in the market.
" Even when transactors act in accordance with RPNs, the terms of their legally
enforceable contract may influence their behavior. Because the provisions of the
contract define the maximum amount that the promisee can recover in the event that
she chooses to treat a particular breach as an end-game breach, these provisions will
affect whether she finds it worthwhile to treat a particular breach as an end-game
breach.
103 A recent study by Jason Johnston, see Jason Johnston, Discovering Contract:
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Inferring Contract Formation Norms from
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where the parties are in a long-term contractual relationship that
they wish to maintain, but where one or both of them have
committed to following a strategy that binds them to seek applica-
tion of EGNs under certain circumstances. 10 4 A transactor might
follow a strategy of seeking application of EGNs in an end-game
round in order to maintain the credibility of his threat to do so in
similar situations in the future. In some contracting contexts,
particularly those characterized by repeat dealing or long-term
relationships, maintaining a credible threat to invoke EGNs in
appropriate circumstances may actually facilitate cooperation.
There are a number of reasons that RPNs are likely to diverge
from the EGNs contained in written contracts. First, RPNs may
reflect adherence to an aspect of the transactors' agreement that
they deliberately allocated to the extralegal realm, perhaps because
the obligation that they sought to create conditioned on information
that was observable but not verifiable, or because the legal system
costs associated with memorializing the obligation in a legally
enforceable provision would have been prohibitively high. Second,
RPNs may reflect patterns of adjustments that transactors are willing
to make at some stages of their contracting relationship but that
they are nonetheless unwilling to promise to make."0 5 Third,
Reported Decisions (Jan. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
provides evidence that when transactors in continuing or repeat-dealing relationships
wind up in court, their relationship is typically at an absolute end-game stage. The
study examined decisions under the Code's statute of frauds provision, UCC § 2-201,
and found support for the hypothesis that when "parties in a continuing relationship
involving repeat dealings within a relatively tight-knit commercial or social community
... [have disputes, the d]isputes between such parties that end up in litigation...
tend to represent end-game situations involving the termination of relationships." Id.
It also examined decisions under the Code's "battle of the forms" provision, UCC § 2-
207, and found that "as the theory would predict, the majority of decisions involving
parties with a history of prior dealings do involve ... serious, relationship-ending
performance problems." Id.
1 4 My study of grain and feed disputes found that traders who arbitrated against
one another often viewed their relationship as being at an absolute end-game.
However, it also found that when the disputing traders worked for medium or large
companies, the companies they worked for did not view themselves as being in an
absolute end-game. Rather, they viewed themselves as being in an end-game round-
they were willing to deal with one another again in the future, but the plaintiff-
company nevertheless fought hard for the application of EGNs. As one grain
company executive explained and others confirmed, companies sometimes seek strict
enforcement of the trade rules and contractual provisions (EGNs) in order to
maintain the credibility of their threat to do so in the future, a threat that may be
quite important to their ability to maintain long-term cooperative relationships and
their ability to routinely obtain reasonable settlements without going to arbitration.
105 See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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RPNs and EGNs may also diverge because RPNs whose effectiveness
depends on social or reputational sanctions imposed by members of
a particular market or social group"' tend to be simpler than the
explicit contractual provisions that cover the same aspects of the
transaction. In addition, these RPNs often have special features that
are designed to enable members of the relevant group to determine
whether the norms have been violated. These features may be both
unnecessary and excessively costly if mechanisms for third-party fact
finding, dispute resolution, and enforcement of judgments are
available. Fourth, because the best norm to govern a particular
situation often depends on transactors' perception of the likelihood
of opportunism, transactors who are in the midst of a cooperative
relationship will often find it desirable to follow norms that would
be highly undesirable if they thought the likelihood of opportunism
was high. Finally, RPNs may diverge from EGNs because there are
many adjustments that transactors would be willing to make to
preserve a profitable relationship that they would be unwilling to
make in the absence of the prospect of future gain.
There is empirical evidence from a variety of contracting
contexts that suggests that merchants behave in ways that reflect an
implicit understanding of the distinction between end-game and
relationship-preserving norms and that they do not necessarily want
the RPNs they follow during the cooperative phase of their
relationship to be used to resolve disputes when their relationship
is at an end-game stage.
In the grain and feed industry, when disputes arise between
merchandisers with a long-standing trading relationship, they will
ordinarily just "split the difference" in an effort not to damage their
relationship.1 7  This is an example of a relationship-preserving
dispute-resolution norm. NGFA arbitrators, however, rarely "split
the difference."0  This aspect of the tribunal's adjudicative
" For examples of such relevant groups, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW (1991) (discussing Shasta County norms); Eric Posner, Law, Economics,
and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996) (discussing the role of the village
gossips). See also Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 86 (discussing diamond industry
norms); Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 10, at 404 (noting that "[c]ommitments
that parties delegate to enforcement by nonlegal sanctions must satisfy different
criteria for explicitness").
... See Interviews with 15 Grain Company Executives (June 1995).
1" When NGFA arbitrators do "split the difference," they are careful to identify
some aspect of the dispute that led them to do so, most commonly that both parties
violated a trade rule, violated a contract provision, or otherwise behaved improperly.
See e.g., Burmeister Farm Store, Ltd. v. Scoular Grain Co., NGFA Case No. 1699
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approach is widely praised by traders and appears to be the desired
EGN. '9 Similarly, while smaller feed merchandisers who transact
primarily on a local or regional basis often include official weight
provisions in their contracts, they routinely accept one another's
unsupervised in-house weights."n Official weights are expensive,
so this practice results in significant transaction cost savings.'"
The norm of accepting in-house weights is a relationship-preserving
performance norm that exists alongside a flatly contradictory
explicit contractual provision embodying the desired EGN-a
provision requiring official weights.
Stewart Macaulay's 1963 study of the contracting practices of
manufacturing firms provides additional evidence that merchants
implicitly distinguish between relationship-preserving and end-game
norms.112  For example, Macaulay's study found that although
buyers and sellers entered into contracts that entitled the seller to
recover expectation damages (an EGN) if the buyer failed to take
the quantity of goods ordered, buyers "expected to be able to cancel
orders freely subject to only an obligation to pay for the seller's
(1993) (averaging the weights provided by each of the parties to calculate damages
when neither party complied with either the contract provisions or the trade rules
relating to weights); CPC Int'l Trading Corp. v. I.S.Joseph Co., NGFA Case No. 1571
(1982) ("[B]oth parties erred and the guilt must be shared equally."); Feeders Grain
Co. v. Italgrani U.S.A. Inc., NGFA Case No. 1575 (1982) ("[Because] both parties
were negligent in checking each other's contracts ... [,] half of Plaintiff's claim
[should] be allowed... ."); Farmers Grain v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., NGFA Case No.
1562 (1981) (splitting the amount of the discount because "it was apparent that
neither party... reported grades as prescribed in the Grain Trade Rules"); Tabor &
Co. v. Cargill Inc., NGFA Case No. 1520 (rendering a compromise judgment, the
arbitrators explained that the amount allowed was "an arbitrary determination
reflecting in part the market conditions at the time, in part the fact of a willful
contract violation on the part of the Defendant, and in part dilatory and imprecise
behavior of the part of the Plaintiff"), modified on appeal, NGFA Arb. App. Case No.
1520 (1976) (reducing the judgment to $12,500 because the defendant's improper
actions were not "willful"). On one occasion, the arbitrators split the difference
because there was not a clear remedy in the trade rules. See R.F. Cunningham & Co.
v. F.M. Brown's Sons Inc., NGFA Case No. 1622 (1985) (holding that because "there
is not a clear-cut remedy in the Trade Rules, it is the arbitration panel's opinion that
the two parties split the claim").
109 See Interviews with Eight Grain Dealers (June 1995).
"' See Interview with Texas Feed Dealer (Mar. 1995); Interviews with Three Texas
Feed Dealers (Jan. 1996).
m The consequences of opportunism associated with this departure from the
contract's terms are not severe. If a transactor thinks his trading partner has short-
changed him in filling a particular shipment, he can reweigh the shipment on his
scales and, if he finds a discrepancy, he can insist that official weights be obtained for
all future transactions.
See Macaulay, Preliminay Study, supra note 82, at 61-62.
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major expenses,"113 a norm closely approximating reliance dam-
ages. Sellers confirmed that in settling such disputes in situa-
tions where lawyers had not yet become involved, they routinely
accepted these reliance-type payments in complete satisfaction of
their claims. Reliance damages seem to be the transactors'
preferred RPN." 4
The study also found that businessmen "will negotiate a solution
when a problem arises apparently as if there had never been any
original contract, "" with the dominant attitude being that "'[y]ou
can settle any dispute if you keep the lawyers and accountants out
of it.' "' This suggests that transactors negotiate primarily,
though not exclusively, in the shadow of RPNs when their relation-
ship is not at an end-game. As one businessman explained, "if
something comes up you get the other man on the telephone and
deal with the problem. You don't read legalistic contract clauses at
each other if you ever want to do business again."11 In those
infrequent instances where "relatively contractual methods are used
to make adjustments in ongoing transactions and to settle disputes,"
this is usually done because the "[d]emands of one side ... are
deemed unreasonable by the other ... [in which case they]
occasionally are blocked by reference to the terms of the agreement
between the parties.""' This suggests that when one transactor
observes the other transactor deviating from implicit RPNs, he may
respond by invoking or threatening to invoke an EGN. In sum,
Macaulay's study suggests that the terms of a written contract are
us Id. at 61.
.1.Another study also found the payment of reliance damages to be the preferred
RPN even though contracts entitling the breached-against party to expectation
damages were often used. See Note, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community:
A Re-appraisal in Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE L.J. 1038, 1061 & n.64 (1957)
(reporting the results of a survey of manufacturers' practices which found that when
customers canceled orders, "30% [of the manufacturers] always or usually take no
action at all, 61% settle for expenses incurred, and 9% insist upon a settlement of
expenses plus lost profits"). It is not surprising that reliance damages would be a
more prevalent RPN than expectation damages. Reliance damages are easier than
expectation damages to estimate objectively, so they are better suited to contexts
where damages are calculated without the assistance of a third-party neutral and
extensive discovery is unavailable. However, it is important to note that in many
contracting contexts, if damages are quickly and voluntarily tendered, the difference
between the expectation and reliance measures is likely to be small.
"I Macaulay, Preliminary Study, supra note 82, at 61.
116 Id.
1 Id.
-8 Id. at 62.
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viewed as relevant primarily when transactors have decided not to
deal again, that is, when their relationship is at an end-game.
The legislative history of the Code provides more explicit
evidence that merchants do not necessarily want RPNs to be applied
by courts in end-game situations. In an early draft of the Code,
Llewellyn proposed replacing the perfect tender rule with a rule of
substantial performance that made a price adjustment, rather than
rejection, the consequence of nonconforming tender. Llewellyn
defended his proposal on the ground that it reflected the ways that
merchants generally dealt with nonconforming tender and would
"impose the better practice of the marketplace as a rule of law.'
9
The New York Merchants Association, however, took the position
that "the price adjustments that merchants made when goods 'are
not entirely up to standard'-'the give and take of ordinary mercan-
tile life,' should not be made obligatory in the law."' 20 It lobbied
for retaining the perfect tender rule, explaining that while the rule
did create a risk that buyers would opportunistically reject goods in
a falling market, this type of opportunism could "take care of [itself]
'mighty quick' through [other] merchant practices," such as sellers
demanding cash in advance from buyers with a reputation for this
sort of behavior.' The Association further explained that a rule
of substantial performance would not only create a risk that sellers
would opportunistically "unload all their shopworn and defective
goods," 122 but would also give juries a vast amount of discretion
that would lead to erratic and error-prone decisions. In the
merchants' view, the combination of the perfect tender rule and
nonlegal sanctions was more advantageous than a rule of substantial
performance with judicial discretion.
123
'9 Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 525 (1987).
120 Id. at 526.
121 Id.
12 Id. (quoting NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS,
CONSIDERATION IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE OF THE FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT OF
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM SALES Ac 65 (1940)).
"' See id. For further evidence that transactors do not necessarily want all of their
legally unenforceable obligations to be legally enforceable, see Note, supra note 114,
at 1060 ("The reluctance of the manufacturers as a group to extend the present scope
of legal protection afforded [oral] business agreements is especially significant, since
most of the manufacturers who indicated that they do not favor such an extension
obtain promises from their customers or suppliers that are not enforceable under
existing law.").
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Thus, merchants recognize the distinction between relationship-
preserving and end-game norms, and do not necessarily want RPNs
to be used to resolve end-game disputes. However, courts applying
the Code's usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
performance provisions routinely take RPNs into account in
deciding cases where the transactors' relationship is at an end-game
stage.'2 4 This adjudicative approach may impose an efficiency loss
on transactors not only because it prevents them from selecting
their preferred mix of legal and extralegal provisions, but also
because in many contexts the content of RPNs is likely to be
different from the content of efficient EGNs. 25 In order to more
fully understand the ways that the Code's adjudicative approach
affects contractual relationships, even in situations where disputes
requiring third-party adjudication never arise, it is useful to
separately consider the effects of courts looking to RPNs reflected
in trade usages and the effects of courts looking to RPNs created by
transactors' courses of performance and courses of dealing.
124 It is, however, important to note that not every contracting relationship that
results in a dispute requiring third-party adjudication is at an end-game stage.
Sometimes transactors are simply unable to reach agreement and may find it
desirable to turn the dispute over to their lawyers and get on with business.
However, even in such situations, it might not be desirable for courts to use RPNs to
resolve disputes. First, because RPNs often condition on information that is
observable but unverifiable, courts applying such norms will often be making error-
prone inquiries that transactors do not view as cost-justified. See supra notes 91-97
and accompanying text. Second, in cases where courts look to RPNs reflected in
transactors' courses of performance, the inquiry required by the Code will force
transactors to scrutinize their past interactions. The party arguing that past actions
do not constitute a course of performance will typically attempt to characterize the
parties' past dealings as contentious, in an effort to show that the disputed actions
were not "acquiesced in without objection." U.C.C. § 2-208(1). As a consequence,
the Code may make it difficult for transactors to maintain their commercial
relationship once a dispute requiring adjudication has arisen. In contrast, NGFA's
arbitration system and its adjudicative approach are designed to enable companies to
submit disputes to arbitration while minimizing the disruption to their relationship.
For example, the Association strongly discourages oral hearings because they tend to
increase the amount of emotional energy that parties invest in the dispute and lead
to a more substantial deterioration of the relationship than arbitrations conducted
without an oral hearing. See NGFA, PROTECTING, supra note 17, at 127 (reporting the
opinion of the general counsel to a large grain company "that the customary NGFA
arbitration which is conducted entirely through written presentation supported by
documents ... is less destructive to personal and corporate relationships than
utilizing the right under the Arbitration Rules for oral hearings"); Interview with
NGFA National Secretary (June 1995) (same).
" See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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A. Usage of Trade
The Code includes usages of trade in the terms of merchants'
legally enforceable agreements and looks to them to "give particular
meaning to the language used"' in written contracts. It justifies
doing so on the theory that because a majority of transactors
implicitly contract with reference to usages, 127 requiring trans-
actors to memorialize the usages they want to be legally enforced in
written provisions would be prohibitively expensive.1 28 However,
even in markets where transactions are concluded using detailed,
standard-form memoranda or trade-association-drafted standard-
form contracts, so that the cost per transaction of memorializing
usages in boilerplate is likely to be low, unwritten usages often
diverge from express contractual provisions. This suggests that the
emergence and endurance of certain practices as usages, rather than
as common contractual provisions, may be due to considerations
other than drafting costs.
Some practices may remain unwritten usages for reasons of
historical accident, or because deeply embedded social practices
discourage greater formalization.' 29 Others may remain usages for
many of the same reasons that individual transactors sometimes find
it advantageous to allocate aspects of their contracting relationship
to the extralegal realm. Practices may, for example, remain
unwritten usages because they condition on observable but
unverifiable information, or because the legal system costs associ-
ated with including them as legally enforceable provisions would be
prohibitively high. Finally, many practices may remain usages
because they reflect the RPNs that transactors in the market as a
1" U.C.C. § 1-204 cmt. 4.
" See id. § 2-202 cmt. 2 ("[W]ritings are to be read on the assumption that...
usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased.").12
8 See SCHWARTZ & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 64-65 (noting and questioning the idea
behind the Code's trade usage provision, namely "that the cost of negotiating
individual sales contracts is reduced [when courts look to trade usage] since parties
can use 'off the rack' assumptions of trade usage without specifically enumerating
them ... [s]ince they are common practices, most bargainers would choose them
anyway").
129 In the diamond industry, for example, the endurance of a transactional
paradigm that makes diamond contracts difficult, if not impossible, to enforce in
court is due, in part, to the large number of orthodoxJews in the diamond industry
and the religious prohibition on one Jew suing another in civil court. See Bernstein,
Diamonds, supra note 86, at 141 (citing THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 20-21
(Menachem Elon ed., 1974)).
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whole are willing to abide by when they trust the person they are
dealing with or want to preserve their relationship.
1 3
0
Courts that look to unwritten trade practices in resolving end-
game disputes may therefore impose an efficiency loss on transac-
tors. By enforcing obligations that were rationally allocated to the
extralegal realm, they will be making inquiries that transactors
agreed ex ante were not worth the cost, and by enforcing RPNs they
will often be imposing costly obligations that transactors would not
have agreed to assume absent the prospect of a continuing
contractual relationship.
It might be argued that even if usages do reflect RPNs or the
terms of extralegal agreements rather than transactors' desired
EGNs, the Code's trade usage provision need not impose any
efficiency loss because transactors can contract around usages they
do not want incorporated into their contract. However, even if
transactors can satisfy the Code's strict requirements for contracting
around a usage,'-" doing so will only protect them from legal
enforcement of the usage in situations where they do not want to
follow the usage. In situations where transactors want to follow a
usage, but do not want their obligation to do so to be legally
enforceable, contracting around the usage may not offer complete
protection from legal enforcement. If transactors routinely abide
by the usage, there is a significant risk that a court will incorporate
it into their agreement as either a course of dealing or a course of
performance, thereby making any expense incurred in negating the
usage a deadweight loss. In practice, the Code makes it very
difficult for transactors to enter into a legally unenforceable
agreement to follow an established trade usage. It may therefore
discourage transactors from behaving, and promising to behave, in
ways that would likely increase the value of their contracting
relationship.
The legal system costs associated with the Code's trade usage
provision may also be significant. It is relatively easy to state a
claim where the existence and/or content of a usage is disputed, so
that the claim survives a motion for summary judgment. 13 2 This
' Usages of trade may not, however, reflect the most efficient RPN for a
particular set of transactors or transactors in the market as a whole. See Posner, supra
note 106 (exploring a variety of reasons why even the norms of relatively dose-knit
groups will not necessarily be efficient).
'" See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 545
(Iowa 1995) (denying the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment on the ground
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may increase transactors' incentives to file nuisance suits. In
addition, when courts look to unwritten usages to decide cases, the
risk that their interpretation of the content of the usage will differ
from the transactors' interpretation is likely to be greater than it is
when the court is interpreting an explicit contractual provision.
This uncertainty over the rule that a court would apply may increase
the likelihood both that transactors will have a dispute and that, if
a dispute arises, they will have divergent views about the expected
trial outcome. This may, in turn, increase the likelihood of a
bargaining impasse, particularly if each transactor is overly optimis-
tic that a court would determine the content of the usage in a
manner favorable to her. The more overly optimistic each transac-
tor is, the more likely it is that a settlement range will not exist and
that a settlement will not be reached.' 3
Finally, although the Code's adjudicative philosophy presup-
poses the existence of an embedded set of unwritten customs that
are truly known and agreed to by transactors, there is some evi-
dence that the existence of such customs might be less pervasive
than the Code assumes. The codification of customary norms in
written trade rules by numerous trade associations that provide
commercial arbitration conducted by industry-expert adjudica-
tors134 suggests that merchants may believe that without codifica-
that there was a disputed issue of material fact as to the existence of a trade usage
that the plaintiff sought to introduce to supplement the terms of a fully integrated
writing).
I" See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LECAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982) ("The usual approach to
bargaining in the legal setting assumes that trial is caused by excessive optimism on
the part of the plaintiff and defendant."); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict
Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth
J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the psychological tendency for the parties
engaged in a dispute to overestimate their chances of success).
13 For example, the following associations have codified their customs into trade
rules: American Cotton Shippers Association, American Fats and Oils Association,
American Peanut Shellers Association, American Seed Trade Association, American
Spice Trade Association, American Tin Trade Association, Association of Food
Industries, Binding Industries of America, Burlap and Jute Association, Cocoa
Merchants' Association of America, Colorado Grain and Feed Association, Diamond
Dealers Club, General Arbitration Council of the Textile and Apparel Industries
(Worth Street Rules), Green Coffee Association of New Orleans, Green Coffee
Association of New York, Kansas City Board of Trade, Memphis Cotton Exchange,
Merchants Exchange of Portland, Mid-America Commodity Exchange, National
Cottonseed Products Association, National Hay Association, National Institute of
Oilseed Products, North American Wholesale Lumber Association, Pacific Coast
Coffee Association, Pacific Northwest Grain and Feed Association, Pennsylvania Rice
Millers' Association, Rubber Trade Association, Specialty Coffee Association of
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tion custom would be too vague and uncertain to be either a
satisfactory guide to proper commercial behavior or a sufficiently
certain basis for arbitrator decisionmaking. 13 5 One of the primary
reasons NGFA decided to codify its customs was that customs
differed so much from one locale to another that codification was
necessary to reduce the incidence of misunderstandings and to
facilitate the growth of a national market.
1 6
1. Caveat
When a generalist court resolves disputes between merchants,
its interpretive decisions are likely to come closer to the trans-
actors' expectations if it looks to trade usage to "give particu-
lar meaning ... to [contract] terms."3 7  However, this type
of interpretive accuracy comes at a cost. There is no consistent
way to distinguish between usages that explain the trade meaning
of express contractual provisions and those that supplement
or qualify the meaning of such provisions. Any rule to be applied
by a generalist court, other than a specific gap-filling rule,
138
must therefore either entirely exclude evidence of trade usage
or permit it to be introduced for all of the purposes identified
in the Code. In contracting contexts where the cost of contract-
America, Tea Association of the USA, Texas Cotton Association, and the Texas Grain
and Feed Association. See Lisa Bernstein, The Newest Law Merchant: Private
Commercial Law in the United States, at tbl. 1 (Nov. 26, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Many other associations publish codes of industry
standards or promulgate standard-form contracts that memorialize industry custom
in contractual boilerplate. See id.
15 There are, however, other explanations for these industries' decisions to codify
their customs. First, codifying custom reduces arbitrators' discretion (because they
do not have to determine the content of the rule), which may make arbitrator bias
easier to detect and hence less likely to occur. Second, codifying custom reduces the
cost of dealing with someone in a location with different unwritten customs. Finally,
the codification of customs is particularly beneficial to large companies that operate
in many areas, because they would otherwise have to appoint a large number of local
agents familiar with local norms or would have to educate their employees about
different local customs.
" In addition, interviews with six small Texas feed dealers established that trade
practices and the meaninigs that transactors attach to common contractual provisions
differ significantly in different parts of Texas. See Interviews with Texas Feed Dealers
(Jan. 1996).
"s U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 4.
"s When the Code's specific gap-filling provisions that direct courts to look to
commercial practice when the contract is silent are strictly applied, they will not have
the same undesirable effects as the Code's general trade usage provision so long as
they are applied only when the contract is truly silent.
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ing under the Code's trade usage provision is significant, there
may be less costly ways for transactors to obtain the benefits
of more trade-specific interpretive decisions. For example, in
transactions where standard-form contracts are used, transactors
could include usages in boilerplate provisions. Alternatively,
in transactions where transactors cannot reduce the "true mean-
ing" of their agreement to a writing with sufficient specificity at a
reasonable cost, but want their relationship to be governed by
customary norms, they could designate an industry-expert wiseman
to resolve disputes in accordance with industry norms. 39 Given the
cost and delay involved in litigation, and the need for courts to
determine the content of such norms from the often conflicting
testimony of expert witnesses, such approaches may be cost-
effective.
In short, recognizing the undesirable effects of the Code's trade
usage provision on commercial relationships suggests that while
looking to usages may improve the accuracy of judicial decisions,
and may be desirable in certain contexts, some merchant-transactors
may nonetheless prefer either to forgo the benefits of this type of
trade-specific interpretive accuracy or to obtain it in other, less
costly, ways.
B. Course of Dealing and Course of Performance
Courses of dealing 140 or courses of performance may also reflect
RPNs, 14' because they are typically established by introduc-
ing patterns of behavior transactors have engaged in over time
"' The use of a nonjudicial third-party as a contract administrator in long-term
relationships was also suggested by Robert Scott. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2049 (1987) ("A more
sensible means of exploiting the considerable power of the long-term relationship
may be appointment of a permanent contract referee ... [,] a single arbiter who can
minimize both information and enforcement problems on an ongoing basis.").
140 For simplicity of exposition, this Section will focus primarily on course of
performance. However, it is important to note that: (1) course of dealing is
somewhat easier to contract out of than course of performance because, unlike some
courses of performance, its content is known by transactors at the time of contract-
ing; and (2) because the longer transactors have been dealing with one another, the
more likely they are to trust one another and be willing to act in ways that differ
significantly from the terms of their contract, RPNs reflected in courses of dealing
may diverge more markedly from the EGNs in transactors' written contracts than the
RPNs reflected in transactors' courses of performance.
4 But see infra part III.B.5 (suggesting that in some contexts course of
performance might reflect a pattern of hold-up under a contract).
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without objection. When transactors anticipate that courts will use
RPNs reflected in their courses of performance or courses of
dealing to resolve end-game disputes, they will be less likely to
flexibly adjust their contractual obligations. They may also find it
more difficult to create stable frameworks for renegotiation and to
maintain long-term commercial cooperation.
1. Flexibility
When transactors are deciding whether to take an action that
might later be deemed a course of dealing or course of perfor-
mance, their decision about whether or not to take the action will
affect, even if it does not completely determine, the likelihood that
if a dispute arises, a court will look to the action taken to interpret
the meaning of the transactors' written agreement and/or to deter-
mine whether they had implicitly agreed to a modification or waiver
of its terms. The fact that a court might look to the action taken to
determine the meaning of a contract will, in most instances, either
decrease or leave unchanged the likelihood that the transactors will
decide to take the action.
There are certain types of adjustments a transactor might be
willing to make at many discrete points in an ongoing contractual
relationship that she would nonetheless be unwilling to promise to
make. Consider, for example, a contract for the sale of ten sacks of
flour per month for twelve months for ten dollars per sack, payable
on the first of the month. Suppose that the buyer (B) asks the seller
(S) if he can pay fifteen days late in January. If S's cash-flow
position is good, and B is a valued customer, S may agree to accept
late payment. If the same situation arises in each of several
subsequent months, and S's cash flow remains good, she may
continue to accept late payment. However, even though S was
willing to accept late payment on several occasions, and may, in fact,
be willing to accept late payment on future occasions, if S cannot
accurately predict her own cash-flow situation, she may nonetheless
be unwilling to promise to accept late payment whenever it is
requested by B.
142
142 S may also be unwilling to agree to a provision obligating her to accept late
payment whenever her cash flow is good. A court may be unable to verify whether
her cash flow is good, and the legal system costs of includinga provision conditioning
on such a vaguely defined consideration may be significant. A suit on the clause
initiated by B would be likely to get past summary judgment, because there would
undoubtedly be disputed issues of material fact. As a consequence, inclusion of the
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In such a situation, although there are sound business reasons
that S would be willing to accept late payment on many occasions
but would be unwilling to promise to accept late payment, a court
presented with evidence that S had accepted late payment on several
occasions would likely find the acceptance of late payment to be a
course of performance. It might therefore be construed as an
enforceable part of the transactors' agreement, a modification of
the payment clause, a waiver of the payment clause, or an important
interpretive consideration. If S anticipates that her acceptance
of late payment without objection on a few .occasions may be
construed by a court as having created a contractual obligation to
continue to accept late payment, she might refuse to accept late
payment on more than one occasion.14 Thus, the Code's course
of performance provision reduces the likelihood that transactors in
ongoing relationships will flexibly adjust their contractual obliga-
tions, even in situations where it would be desirable for them to do
SO.
The effect of the Code's course of performance provision on
transactors' willingness to flexibly adjust their obligations will
depend, in part, on whether the course of performance reflects the
transactors' decision to follow the terms of an extralegal agreement
reached at the time of contracting, or instead reflects either their
decision to follow the terms of an extralegal agreement reached
after the contract was signed or a series of spot adjustments. When
the desired course of performance is in accord with an extralegal
agreement reached at the time of contracting, transactors may be
able to adjust the terms of their written contract to reduce the
likelihood that a court will view a particular course of performance
as creating or modifying a legally enforceable obligation.
Consider, for example, a transaction for the sale of 100 bushels
of No. 2 hard winter wheat a month for ten months at one dollar
per bushel. Suppose that the transactors want to enter into an
clause would increase the risk that B would file a nuisance suit with significant
settlement value, thereby reducing the value of the transaction to S. See David
Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 3, 3 (1985) (presenting a model that illustrates how
a plaintiff who is able to credibly threaten to inflict high litigation response costs on
a defendant before having to incur significant costs himself may be able to extract a
settlement "even though the defendant knows the plaintiff's case is sufficiently weak
that he would be unwilling or unlikely actually to pursue his case to trial").
" See U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 4 (providing that "[a] single occasion of conduct does
not fall within the language of this section").
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extralegal agreement to negotiate a price adjustment when the
wheat is slightly off-grade, but do not want the adjustments they
make under this agreement to be construed by a court as establish-
ing a course of performance that makes a price adjustment, rather
than rejection of nonconforming tender, the legally enforceable
norm.144 In such a situation, the transactors could reduce the
likelihood that a court would find a series of price adjustments to
be a legally enforceable course of performance by including a
provision in their contract stating that "in the event that S delivers
wheat that grades below No. 2, B has the right to reject the goods
unless an agreement to adjust the price is reached." If such a
provision were included in the contract and a dispute relating to a
delivery of off-grade wheat arose after several consensual adjust-
ments had been made, B would then be able to argue that in making
the previous adjustments he was simply exercising one of his
options under the contract. A court might therefore be less likely
to impose a price adjustment as a contractual obligation arising
from a course of performance and might give B the right to reject
the off-grade goods.
Thus, the effects of courts taking course of performance into
account when the course of performance reflects adherence to the
terms of an extralegal agreement reached at the time of contracting
can, to some extent, be avoided by altering the way the contract is
drafted. Transactors may also be able to make these sorts of
drafting adjustments when they anticipate that a court will look to
course of dealing or usage of trade to define their obligations,
because these considerations are also known at the time of contract-
ing. However, this method of contracting around the Code's
interpretative approach will be ineffective in situations where
transactors cannot anticipate the type of flexibility they wish to
preserve, or where drafting and negotiating a provision to cover
each situation in which flexibility might be desirable would be either
impossible or prohibitively expensive.
Once a contract has been entered into and transactors are
considering an action that either conflicts with the terms of their
contract or relates to something the contract does not cover, the
Code effectively gives them three options. First, transactors can
take the action while explicitly disclaiming its prospective applicabil-
14 See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussing the New York
Merchants Association's testimony on the desirability of the Code's proposed rule of
substantial performance).
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ity. This may damage their relationship and may not completely
eliminate the action's effect on the court's interpretation of their
agreement. Second, they can decide not to take the action, thereby
losing whatever benefits the adjustment would have created. Third,
they can take the action and bear the expected costs associated with
the action's effect on the way a court would interpret their contract.
Regardless of the option they select, however, the transactors are
worse off than they would be in a NGFA-type system. The Code
creates barriers, not only to transactors choosing the value-maximiz-
ing combination of legally enforceable contractual provisions and
extralegal provisions, but also to their flexibly adjusting aspects of
their contracting relationship in ways that might increase the value
of their contracting relationship.
2. Renegotiation
In contexts where transactors anticipate that they will often have
to renegotiate particular aspects of their agreement, they may select
the written contractual provisions that will set the most desirable
parameters for renegotiation.14 5 These provisions may differ from
the provisions that particular transactors, or transactors in the
market as a whole, typically agree to when successful renegotiation
takes place. In such contexts, if transactors anticipate that courts
will permit course of performance to alter the meaning of their
written contract, it may be difficult for them to draft provisions that
will set a desirable and stable framework for renegotiation. As their
contracting relationship develops and repeated adjustments are
made, the fact that in the event that renegotiation fails, courts will
look to course of performance in defining and interpreting the
terms of the contract or deciding whether a waiver or modification
' Although the reasons that particular contract provisions are selected cannot be
established with certainty, there is evidence from a study comparing covenants in the
contracts governing bank loans, privately-placed debt, and publicly-traded debt
suggesting that many of the covenants in the contracts that govern privately-placed
debt are used because they set a desirable framework for renegotiation, not because
either the borrower or lender expects them to be strictly enforced. See MARK CAREY
ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT MARKET, BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 5 (1993) (providing evidence that in the private-
placement market "borrowers choosing contracts with restrictive covenants also tend
to be served by lenders that provide flexible renegotiation of the contracts," while
similarly "tight covenants are not present in widely distributed debt because diffuse
owners cannot efficiently... renegotiate," and concluding that the expected ease and
frequency of renegotiation strongly influence the types of provisions commonly found
in different types of debt contracts).
1811
1812 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1765
of its terms has been made means that each transactor's threat point
in the renegotiation, the point which defines the position that she
will be in if renegotiation is unsuccessful, will constantly change,
making nearly any framework for renegotiation established at the
time of contracting inherently unstable.
3. Cooperation
The Code's effects on flexibility and renegotiation may also
make it more difficult for transactors to maintain cooperative
contracting relationships, particularly in repeat-dealing contexts or
long-term relational contracts. In these situations, contractual
obligations are often less precisely defined. As a consequence,
transactors will sometimes inadvertently behave in ways that appear
opportunistic or will mistakenly classify the other transactors'
actions as opportunistic. Under such conditions, cooperation is
more likely to be maintained when both transactors follow a norm
of not responding to every action that appears opportunistic with a
suit for breach of contract or termination of a mutually beneficial
extralegal agreement." Transactors may, for example, adopt a
policy of attempting to negotiate adjustments in response to such
actions until either a particularly harmful breach occurs or a pattern
of smaller breaches leads one transactor to conclude that he is
better off terminating the relationship because he is dealing with an
untrustworthy transactor who will continue to behave opportunistic-
ally.
The Code's course of performance provision, however, increases
the cost of agreeing to forgiving adjustments. It creates a significant
risk that a series of such adjustments will be found to constitute a
course of performance that will operate as a waiver or modification
of the contract's EGNs and will limit the circumstances in which
they can be invoked. Thus, by discouraging the emergence of
transactional norms that include the most desirable combinations
of forgiving adjustments and threats to invoke EGNs in appropriate
circumstances, the Code may reduce the likelihood that long-term
cooperative relationships will arise and endure.
1
4 See AvINASH K. DIXr & BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETnIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLrIcs, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 114 (1991) (exploring
the ways that relatively forgiving strategies can promote cooperation in a variety of
situations).
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4. Caveat
In theory the Code offers transactors a way to minimize, though
not eliminate, the impact of actions and adjustments on their
subsequent obligations by noting their "objection" at the time the
adjustment is made or the action is taken.14 In practice, however,
it is difficult for transactors to completely and reliably negate the
influence of actions and adjustments on the interpretive pro-
cess.14 In addition, even if transactors could adequately negate
the effect of these adjustments by simply noting their objections for
the record, they might nevertheless be reluctant to make their objec-
tions known, because doing so might damage the contracting




In assessing the desirability of the Code's course of performance
provision, it is important to note that there is a reason, apart from
mutually beneficial adjustments, that a course of performance may
deviate from the terms of a contract, or may seem to supply terms
in face of a contractual gap, particularly in a long-term relational-
contract setting where the written contract is largely incomplete.
Courses of performance sometimes reflect patterns of hold-up
under a contract. A transactor may ask for an adjustment at one
147 See U.C.C. § 2-208(1) ("Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions
for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.").
" In thinking about the desirability of default rules from a practical point ofview,
it is also important to consider the stages in a contracting relationship where a lawyer
is typically present. Lawyers are more likely to be present when contracts are drafted
than they are at each stage of performance when the objection necessary to avoid an
action being construed as a modification or waiver must be made. As a consequence,
the Code may encourage lawyers, whose personal interests may lead them to be even
more concerned about the event of breach than are their clients, to advise clients to
note their objection to everything that deviates from the explicit obligations outlined
in the contract. If this advice is written into company policies, it will decrease
flexibility and may undermine cooperation.
' The Article 2 Revision Committee recently endorsed moving the Code's course
of performance provision to Article 1, where it would apply to all aspects of
commercial relationships governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the
analysis presented here suggests that such an amendment would have undesirable
effects on commercial relationships and should therefore be opposed.
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point in time, and the other transactor may consent, reasoning that
the request was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the
prospective value of the relationship is so high that it is worthwhile
to agree. This may happen a few times, until the transactor
agreeing to the concessions realizes that each request is not a plea
for cooperation in changed circumstances, but rather a part of a
pattern of attempts to extract concessions. After realizing this, the
transactor who had been agreeing to concessions will reevaluate the
prospective value of the relationship under the assumption that the
requests for concessions will continue, and may conclude that there
is no longer any reason to preserve the relationship. He may
therefore decide to declare breach and bring suit on the contract.
A court looking at this behavior may find the terms of the contract
to have been supplemented, modified, or waived by the course of
performance. It may therefore enforce the extortionist's terms.
Although a court would not do so if these terms appeared unreason-
able, a transactor may still gain significant financial advantage by
following this course of action, because courts may not be able to
adequately distinguish small hold-ups from flexible adjustments of
the relationship.
1 5 0
C. Expansion of Commercial Practices
Finally, it is important to note that to the extent that courses of
performance or courses of dealing that are not required by the
terms of transactors' written contracts, but that are widely observed
by numerous transactors over time, give rise to new trade usag-
es, 5 the fact that the Code systematically discourages such
courses of action from being followed by making transactors less
willing to deviate from the terms of their written contracts and less
'" It is important to note that a move to a legal regime that did not enforce
courses of performance would affect transactors' reliance decisions. When
transactors are aware that course of performance will not be taken into account,
however, they can adjust their reliance decisions to reflect their view of the strength
of the nonlegal sanctions supporting the extralegal agreement and can structure their
relationship (by, for example, dividing performance that deviates from the contract's
explicit terms into smaller increments, thus reducing vulnerability) to increase the
effectiveness of these sanctions. Alternatively, in situations where they would make
particularly large reliance decisions were their relationship to be governed by the
current Code regime, they could still enter into legally enforceable modifications that
would enable them to obtain the benefits of legal enforcement.
1 See JOHN GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY 34-40 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing Hayek's
theory of spontaneous order).
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willing to enter into extralegal agreements means that its adju-
dicative approach will inhibit the "continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the par-
ties."152 In addition, to the extent that the Code also tends to
discourage transactors from including contractual provisions varying
existing usages, because existing usages are likely to remain relevant
to interpretation of the provision that attempts to alter them,1 53 the
Code will also retard the expansion of commercial practices through
innovative contractual drafting." This tendency is reinforced by
the discount that the Code's contextualized approach imposes on
the benefit of drafting innovative express terms by making it less
likely that they will be enforced as written.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSACTIONAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The analysis presented here has identified a variety of reasons
that sophisticated merchant-transactors may prefer an adjudicative
approach that is largely acontextual and gives primacy to the
express terms of written agreements. This Part explores certain
aspects of grain and feed transactions and the institutional environ-
ment created by NGFA that make a formalistic adjudicative
approach particularly well-suited to the private adjudication of
disputes among grain and feed merchants.
152 U.C.C. § 1-102(b). For example, the Code's adjudicative approach decreases
the likelihood that usages that condition on observable but unverifiable information,
particularly those that involve actions that are taken more than once in a typical
contracting relationship, will arise. Consider two transactors who are considering
following the practices required by a nascent usage that conditions on unverifiable
information but has not yet become widely enough followed to constitute a usage
under the Code. In such a situation, the transactors would reason that if they
followed the usage on more than one occasion and a dispute arose, a court would
take it into account as a course of performance. However, because the usage
conditions on unverifiable information, this is something the transactors would find
undesirable. As a consequence, they would be reluctant to follow the usage in the
first place. Because most transactors would reason in a similar manner, the Code
reduces the likelihood that practices that condition on unverifiable information will
become usages. It is, however, possible that some such usages may continue to arise
in transactional settings where transactors view the probability of a dispute going to
court as being exceptionally low, and the benefit of following the usage as being
exceptionally high.
153 See supra notes 73-74 (discussing the difficulty of completely negating a usage).
'"4 Cf Goetz & Scott, supra note 90, at 276-79 (reaching the same conclusion).
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A. Transactional Context
One of the main reasons that a formalistic approach is well-
suited to NGFA's adjudication of disputes is that the types of events
that can disrupt a grain or feed transaction are, except in highly
unusual circumstances, known by transactors at the time of
contracting. Most of these contingencies are dealt with through
either a trade rule or an explicit provision in a standard-form
memorandum, making the typical contract for the purchase of grain
or feed close to the ideal-type complete contingent state contract.
Unlike many types of contracting relationships governed by the
Code, in which the written contract does not completely define the
relationship between the transactors, grain and feed contracts are
well-specified.'5 5 In addition, because most contracts are negotiated
quickly on the telephone, transactors tend not to include complex
nonstandard provisions. 56 As a consequence, NGFA arbitrators
are confronted with fewer gaps and interpretive disputes than
courts.
A primary shortcoming attributed to NGFA-type adjudication is
that judgments may not be well-tailored to the facts of particular
155 There are a number of other aspects of the institutional environment created
by NGFA that encourage the drafting of complete contracts. First, given NGFA's
adjudicatory philosophy, the value of including an express provision is greater than
it is in a contract governed by the Code, because the provision is more likely to be
enforced as written. Second, because relative to litigation, the NGFA system reduces
the cost and increases the accuracy of third-party fact-finding and dispute resolution,
more information will be verifiable, that is, worthwhile to prove to the NGFA
arbitrators, than would be verifiable in litigation. As a consequence, contracts that
will be interpreted and enforced in the NGFA system can be more complete than
contracts that will be interpreted and enforced in court, because they can include
provisions conditioning on a broader range of considerations. Third, NGFA's widely
circulated opinions routinely chastise transactors whom arbitrators view as having left
unwarranted gaps or ambiguities in their agreement, thereby giving transactors an
incentive not to leave gaps. See, e.g., Fred Webb Inc. v. Cargill Inc., NGFA Case No.
1691 (1993) ("This dispute would have been avoided if the parties had addressed the
type of destination grades to be used."); Dixie Portland Flour Mills Inc. v. Guthrie
Cotton Oil Co., NGFA Case No. 1637 (1988) ("The arbitration panel wished to
emphasize that the contract terms themselves may be a partial cause of this dispute.
It is the obligation of both buyer and seller to make certain the contract terms
accurately reflect their intentions.... ."); Leo Hinson v. Parker Grain Co., NGFA Case
No. 1628 (1986) ("The arbitration panel was unanimous in wishing to caution the
trade as to the necessity of using well-thought-out contracts that dearly encompass
all of the obligations of both buyers and seller to each other."); Gulf Coast Grain Co.
v. Central States Enters., NGFA Case No. 1569 (1982) ("[C]ompanies must recognize
the risks they are taking if delivery terms are not specific.").
" See Interview with Grain Company Lawyer (Jan. 1995).
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cases. However, grain and feed transactions are so standardized
that the facts of any particular case are likely to be close to the
archetypal transaction contemplated by the drafters of the trade
rules. In addition, because the amount at stake in a typical dispute
tends to be small,157 due in part to the existence of a well-devel-
oped spot market that makes cover and mitigation readily available
and a trade rule that provides that "[f]ailure to perform in keeping
with the terms and conditions of a contract shall be grounds for the
refusal only of such shipment or shipments and not for the
rescission of the entire contract or any other contract between
Buyer and Seller,"158 the consequences of adjudicative error in any
one case will often be small relative to the assets of the parties.
Therefore, transactors in the market as a whole may view any
inefficiencies introduced through lack of tailoring in a particular
case as being vastly outweighed by the cost savings and other
benefits created by NGFA's adjudicative approach.
Finally, NGFA's adjudicative approach creates important benefits
for large grain companies, who employ hundreds of contracting
agents (merchandisers) who enter into numerous contracts each day
as well as hundreds of shipping clerks who fill hundreds of contracts
a day. Because NGFA refuses to imply terms that do not appear in
written contracts or the trade rules, employees cannot unobservably
bind their companies to obligations not contained in their com-
panies' standard-form contracts. If an employee wants to execute
a binding rider to the contract, the rider must be signed and in
writing. By relieving large companies of the need to implement
controls that would prevent their agents from unobservably binding
them to obligations, NGFA's adjudicative approach may reduce
large companies' intrafirm agency costs.' 59 Furthermore, the
codification of custom and the lack of enforcement of unwritten
usage mean that merchandisers for large companies will not have to
incur the substantial cost of learning dozens of local customs.
NGFA's adjudicative approach therefore substantially reduces the
cost to large companies of dealing in geographically dispersed
markets.
"5 Between 1975 and 1990, NGFA's largest award was $138,040. See Triple "F"
Feeds v. Cook Indus., NGFA Arb. Case No. 1532 (1977).
158NGFA GLAIN TRADE R. 43.
'" In general, companies are likely to favor trade rules and adjudicative
approaches that minimize the sum of intrafirm agency costs and the transaction costs
of dealing with other firms.
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B. Institutional Context
Unlike the Code, which was designed to govern many different
types of transactions and therefore includes many vague gap-filling
provisions that are tailored to the particular case by looking to
commercial context, the NGFA Trade Rules are narrowly tailored
to the industry's needs. They precisely define the meaning of
common contractual language, 160 embody many of the industry's
established customs and usages, and provide a menu of pre-
formulated terms that transactors can easily reference in their
contracts. As a consequence, the marginal benefit of NGFA
arbitrators looking to unwritten usage in an effort to tailor the
meaning of a contractual provision or trade rule is far less than the
marginal benefit of a court looking to these considerations to tailor
a vague Code default rule or interpret an ambiguous contractual
provision. Because the trade rules are well-suited to most transac-
tions, transactors draft fewer nonstandard clauses than they would
if the Code were to govern their contracts.1 61 When transactors
do include nonstandard clauses, such clauses tend to be drafted
clearly. The prospect that such clauses will be routinely enforced as
written gives the drafter an added incentive to draft the terms
clearly, because their full value will be realized if a dispute arises.
Although NGFA arbitration is formalistic, settlements negotiated
in its shadow may nevertheless reflect equitable considerations.
NGFA arbitrators sometimes rule in favor of a party on the basis of
an explicit contractual provision or trade rule, while at the same
time noting in their widely circulated opinions that although the
winning party "technically prevailed," he nonetheless acted contrary
to an unwritten usage, good business practices, the spirit of a trade
rule, or an implicit understanding.'6 2 As a consequence, transac-
160 See, e.g., NGFA GRAIN TRADE R. 4 (defining, among other terms, "official
weight," "affidavit Weight," and "official inspection"); NGFA GRAIN TRADE R. 8
(defining, among other terms, "shipment," "delivery," "prompt," and "first week");
NGFA GRAIN TRADE R. 13 (defining "buying-in" and "selling-out").
... See Goetz & Scott, supra note 90, at 289 (discussing how the "state's provision
of standardized contractual signals ... create[s] a relative disadvantage to innovative
instructions that depart from conventional terms").
..2 See, e.g., Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Early & Daniel Co., NGFA Case No. 1547
(1979) (holding for the defendant under the explicit terms of a trade rule, the
arbitrators noted that "the arbitration committee sympathizes with the Plaintiff in his
position," and feels "[t]here is a question of fairness and intent which is raised in this
case"). In addition, the arbitrators will sometimes criticize the business practices of
both parties. See, e.g., General Mills Inc. v. Cook Indus., NGFA Case No. 1540 (1978)
(ruling for the plaintiff but noting that "evidence clearly showed poor supervision of
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tors sometimes offer settlements even when they know they will
prevail at arbitration.163 The arbitrators' willingness to send these
types of signals may encourage transactors to reach settlements that
reflect equitable considerations as well as the expected value of the
arbitrators' monetary award. It may also encourage traders to settle
disputes in situations where their individual egos are the primary
barrier to settlement. In such situations, each trader may fear that
being chastised for bad business practices in an arbitration opinion
will limit his opportunities for advancement within his own
company.'6 When transactors are aware that an opinion will be
written if an arbitration takes place, reputation bonds will be better
able to ensure that transactors perform their obligations or settle
their disputes in the shadow of their true understanding, thereby
taking some of the harsh edge off the NGFA's bright-line, inflexible
rules and its formalistic adjudicative approach. 5
It is also important to note that NGFA's use of bright-line trade
rules and a formalistic adjudicative philosophy severely restrict
arbitrator discretion and minimize the need for arbitrators both to
rely on and assess the credibility of testimony. This is particularly
important in the trade-association context, where the adjudicators
are themselves market transactors and the risk of adjudicative bias
is perceived to be substantial. Combined with the requirement that
NGFA opinions state the factual basis for their holdings, this
the trade and accompanying logistics [on the part of both companies]. Execution for
the most part was handled by clerks and secretaries and not merchandisers and
management. Both of these large companies should have been experienced in this
area."); Cook Indus. v. Triple "F" Feeds, NGFA App. Case No. 1532 (1977) (affirming
the primary arbitration panel'sjudgment against the defendant while noting that the
"Arbitration Appeals Committee observes regretfully that both parties to this
transaction left much to be desired in their preparation and performance of the
contract").
" See Interview with Grain Dealer (Mar. 1996); Interview with Grain Company
Executive (Mar. 1996); Interview with Grain Dealer (June 1995).
'1 See Interview with Grain Company Executive (June 1995) (explaining that in
counseling individual traders to "work it out" with the other party, he often reminds
them that it might hurt their prospects for advancement within the company to have
their business practices criticized in an arbitration opinion); Interview with Three
Grain Company Executives (May 1996) (noting that being chastised for bad business
practices in an arbitration opinion can end a trader's career at a particular company).
I" See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theoy of Default Rulesfor Commercial Contracts,
19J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 614-15 (1990) (suggesting, in an attempt to "explain the law's
preference for clear, tough, winner-take-all default rules," that "[u] nderstood in their
broader context [they] serve as an effective complement to the more flexible means
of social adjustment," and "set the stage for cooperative adjustments that take place
on an on-going, extralegal basis").
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approach makes it easier for market participants to assess whether
a given case was correctly decided.' This, in turn, makes it
easier for a tribunal to establish and maintain a reputation for
impartiality and enables more nuanced information about transac-
tors' reputation to be disseminated to the market.
Finally, because the institutional environment created by NGFA
operates to strengthen extralegal enforcement mechanisms such as
reputation bonds, 67 extralegal agreements are likely to be value-
creating supplements to many grain and feed contracts, particularly
among local or regional merchandisers who trade with one another
on a repeat basis. As a consequence, ensuring that extralegal
agreements remain extralegal is particularly valuable in grain and
feed markets, making NGFA's adjudicative approach particularly
well-suited to the private adjudication of grain and feed disputes.
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified a number of undesirable effects on
commercial relationships between merchants created by the Code's
search for immanent business norms. It has also suggested that the
Code's highly contextualized approach to adjudication is flawed
because it mistakenly assumes that transactors' actions under a
contract are the best indication of what they intended their writing
to mean, when in fact these actions are likely to reflect the RPNs
transactors find it desirable to follow when they cooperatively
resolve disputes, not the EGNs they would want a court to apply if
they wind up in litigation. However, because the Code also governs
other types of contracting relationships, such as merchant-to-
consumer transactions,'" where the arguments in favor of contex-
'" The publication of opinions appears to influence transactors' views of the
integrity of the tribunal. See Interviews with Six Grain Dealers (June 1995).
According to a Texas grain dealer who is a former chairman of the Texas Grain and
Feed Association's ("TGFA") arbitration panel, the credibility of the TGFA arbitration
system and the quality of the decisions it rendered improved dramatically when the
association introduced a rule requiring the publication of opinions. See Interview
with Texas Grain Dealer (June 1995).
167 For example, NGFA: (1) circulates arbitration opinions to all members; (2)
conducts trade-rules seminars and other educational programs that are designed,
among other things, to create an industry-wide consensus about what constitutes
acceptable commercial behavior; and (3) publishes a newsletter that prominently
announces suspensions, expulsions, and noteworthy arbitration decisions.
" The arguments in favor of allowing courts to look to course of dealing and
course of performance to establish the terms and interpret the meaning of an
agreement are far stronger in merchant-to-consumer transactions where the problems
MERCHANT LAW IN A MERCHANT COURT
tualized adjudication may be stronger than they are in merchant-to-
merchant transactions, the analysis presented here does not
necessarily suggest that the entire Code should be amended to
reflect a more formalistic adjudicative approach.
Rather, the arguments presented here, together with the
empirical evidence from the NGFA arbitration system, suggest that
the Code should be amended to include a "safe harbor" provision
that would give merchant-transactors a simple and reliable way to
either opt out of the Code's adjudicative approach or selectively opt
out of its usage of trade, course of performance, or course of
dealing provisions. Such a safe harbor would enable merchant-
transactors to select their preferred degree of contextualized
adjudication and would transform the Code's quasi-mandatory
interpretive approach into a default approach that merchant-
transactors could avoid when they found it advantageous to do so.
More generally, the analysis presented here suggests that the
Article 2 Revision Committee should carefully rethink its sweeping
endorsement of Llewellyn's adjudicative approach, an approach that
was developed to be accommodating to merchant concerns but that
has many undesirable effects on merchant transactions and
undermines, rather than furthers, the Code's own stated goals of
"preserv[ing] the flexible character of commercial contracts," 69
and "permit[ting] the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.
" 17
of reliance and asymmetric information are often more pronounced. As between the
terms of detailed contracts, the default rules of the Code, and their experience during
the contracting relationship, consumers may often tend to rely on their personal
experiences, which may make the Code's contextualized approach essential to
protecting consumers.
169 U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 2.
17 0Id. § 1-102(b).
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